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PROLOGUE
The Treasury Department is empowered to enforce "established
public policy" with respect to tax-exempt charities.' Under this
public policy power, the Treasury has revoked the tax-exempt
charitable status of organizations that discriminated against blacks,
organizations whose members engaged in civil disobedience
against war, and organizations involved in illegal activity.2  The
Treasury interprets its public policy power as applying to any activ-
ity that violates clear public policy! Thus, presumably, the Treas-
ury could use this power to deny tax-exempt charitable status to an
organization that engages in conduct that violates assisted suicide
laws, anti-abortion laws, or other sufficiently "established" public
policies.4
The point at which a public policy is sufficiently established for
purposes of applying the Treasury's public policy power is unclear.5
For example, could the Treasury revoke an organization's tax-
' See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983). The Treasury accom-
plishes this enforcement role by either revoking or denying tax-exempt charitable status of
organizations that violate "established public policy." See id. Hereinafter references to revo-
cation of tax-exempt charitable status shall include denial of applications for said status.
See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (providing that advocating civil disobedience
violates public policy); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (stating that racial nondiscrimina-
tion policies comport with public policy); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("We
believe that engaging in conduct or arrangements that violate the anti-kickback statute is
inconsistent with continued exemption as a charitable hospital.").
See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-001 (Nov. 30, 1988) ("Although applying on its face only
to race discrimination in education, the [public policy power] extends .. .to any activity
violating a clear public policy."). In determining whether an organization's activities will be
considered permissible under section 501 (c) (3): (1) the purpose of the organization must
be charitable; (2) the activities must not be illegal, contrary to a clearly defined and estab-
lished public policy, or in conflict with express statutory restrictions; and (3) the activities
must be in furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose and reasonably related to the
accomplishment of the purpose. See Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175. Thus, even where an
organization is in strict compliance with "the law," the public policy power permits the
Treasury to revoke or deny charitable status if the organization's admittedly legal activity
violates "established public policy." See id.
' See 1994 IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CPE TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM
TEXTBOOK, Chapter L: Illegality and Public Policy Considerations §4.b., 94 TNT 71-47 [hereinaf-
ter IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TEXTBOOK ] ("Just as the Service responded to public out-
rage over racial discrimination in education in Bob Jones and to possible kickbacks in GCM
39862, the Service can be expected to re-evaluate positions in other areas as the public pol-
icy considerations become more clearly focused because of Congressional action, decisions
of the Executive Branch, or court actions.").
' See id. ("Deciding a case on the basis of public policy rather than a specific law is
difficult because it requires discerning what the public policy involved really is.").
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 391 1999-2000
University of California, Davis [Vol. 33:389
exempt charitable status on the ground that the organization en-
gages in race-based affirmative action?6 Presently, neither Congress
nor the United States Supreme Court has decided conclusively
whether race-based affirmative action violates public policy.7 Even
the present Democratic administration has expressed some misgiv-
ings about race-based affirmative action."But what if the Treasury were to read recent anti-affirmative ac-
tion decisions9 and legislation, 10 and determine that race-based af-
' See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-32-024 (May 17, 1996) (concluding that where nominees for
proposed scholarship were limited to American Indians, program was consistent with public
policy "reflected in the traditional and long-standing relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and Indian tribes.").
' However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has concluded that race-based
affirmative action is necessarily unconstitutional in the context of race-exclusive scholarships
by public institutions. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
dened, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (concluding that race-exclusive scholarship program at Univer-
sity of Maryland violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Another
federal court of appeals reached the same result in the context of race-conscious admission
policies at public universities. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 967-68 (5th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that, in Fifth Circuit, government can never use race as factor when making
decisions about public law school admissions), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
' In his 1995 pledge to maintain and support affirmative action efforts, President
Clinton directed a task force appointed to review affirmative action that it should "[m]end
it, don't end it." See Louis Freedberg & Susan Yoachum, Affirmative Action Showdown: Clinton
Makes Emotional Plea for Programs, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 1995, at Al; see also Michael Lynch,
After Affirmation Action, REASON ONLINE (visited Feb. 3, 2000) <http://www/reason.com/
961 1/ftr.lynch.html> (on file with author).
' See, e.g., Adarand. Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (concluding
that race could not be used as factor in federal, state or local government operations without
first satisfying strict scrutiny standard); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 967-68 (holding that, in Fifth
Circuit, government may not consider race in public law school admissions process). But see
Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that portion of trust
created for exclusive benefit of native people that limits trustees to those native people does
not violate Fourteenth Amendment because limitation is "not a racial classification, but a
legal one based on who are beneficiaries of the trusts"), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1248 (1999).
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether these native people classifica-
tions should be treated the same as other racial classifications. See id. at 1079 (stating that
"the constitutionality of the racial classification that underlies the trusts and [its administra-
tor] is not challenged in this case"); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the
Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 538 (1996) (stating that
"[t]he Court has never squarely addressed the relationship between the [native people
classifications and racial classifications] ... or explicitly delineated the boundary between
tribal and racial classifications"). The United States Supreme Court recently held in Rice v.
Cayetano that Hawaii's denial of voting rights to non-Hawaiians is a racial classification that
violates the Fifteenth Amendment. See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000).
0 Two states in the recent past, California in 1996 (Proposition 209) and Washington
in 1998 (Initiative 200), have adopted positions opposed to affirmative action by enacting
laws that outlaw government "discriminat[ion] against" and "preferential treatment to"
anyone based on "race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin" in "public" operations. See
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (West Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1998). Similarly,
the Governor of Florida recently issued an executive order ending state-sponsored affirma-
392
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firmative action violates "established public policy"? Assuming the
Treasury interprets recent trends against affirmative action as
showing that organizations engaging in race-based affirmative ac-
tion violate a clear policy on race, the Treasury could place a seri-
ous burden on affirmative action programs of private entities by
revoking the entities' tax-exempt charitable status." Using race-
based affirmative action as the example, this Article highlights
some of the problems and dangers with the Treasury's public pol-
icy power.12
tive action in the state of Florida. See Florida Governor's Executive Order 99-281 (visited Feb. 4,
2000) <http://www.state.fl.us /eog/executiveorders/1999/november/eo99-281.html> (on
file with author).
" See discussion infra note 213 and accompanying text. Primarily because of the many
valuable state and federal benefits that accompany 501 (c) (3) charitable status, many chari-
ties need such status for mere survival. In addition to possible loss of exemption from the
federal income tax, I.R.C. § 501 (a), revocation or denial of charitable status would likely
mean loss of many other federal benefits, including (1) the ability to receive tax-deductible
contributions from the public, I.RC. § 170, (2) exemption from the federal unemployment
tax, § 3306(c)(8), (3) eligibility for preferred postal rates, 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (1999), (4)
ability to issue tax-exempt bonds, I.R.C. § 145, and (5) ability to provide certain types of tax-
deferred retirement plans for employees, I.R.C. § 403(b). Many state benefits also hinge on
an organization maintaining tax-exempt charitable status, including exemption from (1)
real property taxes, (2) sales and use taxes, (3) business and occupational taxes, (4) state
unemployment taxes, and (5) the requirement to pay certain permit or license fees. See
generallyJAMEsJ. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 314-15
(1995); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.2 (7th ed. 1998).
In fact, some charities obtain federal tax-exempt status merely to obtain these state benefits.
See FISHMAN, supra, at 335 ("Many nonprofits do not earn a significant net profit or rely on
charitable contributions as a major source of their support. State and local tax exemptions
may be the most significant governmental benefit for these organizations, especially if they
own real property"). Thus, a charity whose existence depends on these many corollary
benefits to 501 (c) (3) status may not be able to pursue its affirmative action efforts if the
charity's tax-exempt status is revoked or denied.
" Other contemporary examples might well have been used to demonstrate the
problematic aspects of the Treasury's public policy power. For example, the recent VMI
decision could prompt the Treasury to question whether same sex schools - either all-male
or all-female - violate "established public policy" with respect to gender preference. See
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556-58 (1996) (holding that state's policy of
admitting only men to state school violates equal protection); Christopher H. Pyle, Women's
Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex StillJustifiable AfterUnited States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REV. 209,
260-71 (1997) (discussing whether women's colleges have sufficient grounds to exclude men
after VM); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
407, 453-54 (1999) (discussing potential broad application of Bob Jones University and public
policy limitation and indicating that "VM! might be the crucial precedent for Smith and
Wellesley ... because it establishes that such support is contrary to public policy"); Edward
A. Zelinsky, Are Tax Benefits Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 379, 383-87 (1998) (discussing implications of VM! for same-sex tax-exempt
institutions).
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court greatly enhanced the Treasury's power as an
administrative agency when, in Bob Jones University v. United States,
13
it first recognized the power of the Treasury to make tax law deci-
sions based on the Treasury's assessment of nontax public policy
matters (like racial discrimination). The context of the Court's
historic decision - a white institution discriminating against blacks
- made recognition of the public policy power appealing in 1983.
Bob Jones University, however, raises serious concerns regarding the
legal limits of the Treasury authority, especially in today's society. 5
This Article's thesis is that Bob Jones University gave the Treasury
unreasonably broad power.16
The problem with the public policy power, as currently defined,
is that the majority in Bob Jones University inappropriately recog-
" 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
SeeJohn D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption
for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARiz. L. REv. 841, 853-55 (1993) (describing IRS's
decision to withhold funds from discriminating schools); Miriam Galston, Public Policy Con-
straints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAx REv. 291, 310-22 (1984) (concluding that "trust
law does not provide the theoretical foundation for public policy constraints in the area of
federal tax law"); Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1353, 1365-66 (1983) (stating that IRS properly used
rulemaking authority in Bob Jones University); Jerome Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in
Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CATH. LAW. 301, 306-07 (1978) (describing IRS's
policy against discrimination); Karla W. Simon, Applying the Bob Jones Public-Policy Test in
Light of TWR and U.S. Jaycees, 62 J. TAX'N 166-67 (1985) (stating federal public policy as
articulated in Bob Jones University); William A. Drennan, Note, BobJones University v. United
States: For Whom Will the Bell Toll?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 591-93 (1985) (commenting on
alleged IRS usurpation of legislative authority); Sherri L. Thornton, Note, Taxation in Black
and White: The Disallowance of Tax-Exempt Status to Discriminatory Private Schools - Bob Jones
University v. United States, 27 How. L.J. 1769, 1793-96 (1984) (arguing that IRS authority
aids in recognition of racist motivations).
" For example, what does it mean to have a federal tax agency deciding if a particular
group is sufficiently "charitable" for entitlement to tax-exempt status? See, e.g., Perry Dane,
The Public, the Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a Theme ofNomos and Narrative, 8 CARDoZO
STUD. L. & LrrERATuRE 15, 27 (1996) ("Bob Jones was not aboutjust any tax exemption or tax
deduction. The IRS is not, especially without explicit legislative directionjust in the habit of
withdrawing tax benefits to taxpayers who discriminate on the basis of race.").
"s The immediate result of the Court's decision in Bob Jones University was that organiza-
tions discriminating against blacks could not be granted tax-exempt charitable status. This
Article does not challenge that result. Indeed, discrimination against blacks was and is so
abhorrent that the result was necessarily preordained. However, the process the Court used
in arriving at its decision is troubling in today's environment in which racial remediation
efforts are being challenged, in some cases successfully so, as unlawful "discrimination"
against whites.
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nized in the Treasury an implied statutory authority17 to operate as
both determiner and enforcer of "established public policy.". The
Treasury's revocation of an entity's charitable status because the
entity violates established public policy may be invalid because it
exceeds the scope of the Treasury's delegated authority over tax
matters. Courts have routinely held that an agency's interpretive
power is limited to the scope of that agency's statutory authority.' 9
Furthermore, an agency's statutory authority is often defined by
the agency's expertise. Actions beyond the agency's scope of au-
thority, and hence its expertise, are necessarily unlawful. Thus, for
example, absent specific direction by Congress, the Federal Power
Commission ("FPC") is not authorized to require that power com-
panies adopt antidiscrimination rules - even though the FPC op-
erates pursuant to a statutory command to regulate these entities
in the "public interest."20  Similarly, the Treasury should not have
the legal authority to deny charitable status to a tax-exempt charity
based solely on the nontax public policy factors.
" When this Article refers to the Treasury's "statutory" or "legal" authority to act, that
means the Treasury's statutory authority granted by Congress. It is not intended as an indi-
cation of constitutional authority or constitutional mandate. The Court in Bob Jones Univer-
sity specifically chose not to address the constitutional mandate issue because of its resolu-
tion of the "statutory/legal" authority issue. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599 n.24 ("Many
of the amici curiae . . . argue that denial of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
schools is independently required by the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment. In light of our resolution of this litigation, we do not reach that issue.") (citations
omitted).
" See discussion infra Part II. Justice Powell highlighted this problematic aspect of the
Treasury's public policy power in his concurring opinion in Bob Jones University. While con-
curring in the Court's conclusion that tax exempt charitable status is not available to organi-
zations that discriminate against blacks, see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 608 (Powell, J., con-
curring), Justice Powell questioned whether the Court went too far in authorizing the
Treasury, as opposed to Congress, to decide when other policies are sufficiently established.
See id. at 611-12. Specifically, Justice Powell stated:
I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these substantial interests is for
Congress to perform. I am unwilling to join any suggestion that the [Treasury] is
invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently
"fundamental" to require denial of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer
laws designed to produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public
policy".... The contours of public policy should be determined by Congress, not
byjudges or the IRS.
Id.
t9 See infra Part II.A.
" See NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976).
" See IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TExTBooK, supra note 4, at § 5. To be specific:
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The potential danger with the Treasury's public policy power is
that the Treasury might use its power to halt appropriate affirma-
tive action efforts by tax-exempt charities.22 Even if the Treasury
appropriately uses its power to revoke the tax-exempt status of
charities that discriminate against blacks, the Court should limit
application of the power to circumstances in which Congress has
clearly defined the applicable policy standard. It would be incon-
sistent with national race policies for the Treasury to revoke the
tax-exempt charitable status of a charity that provides preferences
to blacks, sometimes at the expense of whites, when the preference
is for compelling and necessary purposes. Indeed, this nation has
no established public policy against all incidences of racial prefer-
ences.23  Recent federal and state governmental decisions about
race evidence a clear tolerance for appropriate affirmative action
- those race conscious remedial efforts to eliminate the effects of
systematic race-based discrimination. Further, civil rights laws are
premised on the notion that elimination of discrimination against
blacks is a paramount goal in domestic race relations.25 Given our
nation's tolerance level for racial preferences for blacks and other
minorities in pursuit of racial justice, the Treasury should limit
application of its public policy decisions to situations of discrimina-
tion against blacks and other minority groups.
Part I of this Article examines the source and scope of the
Treasury's public policy power. Specifically, Part I focuses on that
power in the broader contexts of (a) the role of an administrative
A difficulty in applying the illegality [or public policy] doctrine is that it may not
always be easy to determine whether the activity in question was actually illegal.
This is particularly true where the statute in question is outside the Service's juris-
diction. Where the activity does not violate tax laws, the Service must either rely
on another governmental body's determination of illegality or make its own. Each
of these situations poses problems.
Id.
See discussion infra Part III. This Article often uses restrictive phrases (such as "ap-
propriate") in reference to affirmative action plans because not all types of affirmative action
necessarily share the same social justice goals or legal status. See generaUy Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Action Debate, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1996)
(arguing that "[a] meaningful discussion of affirmative action must be particularized, focus-
ing on what specific types of actions are permissible under what circumstances.").
SeeJanice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and Reverse Discrimination: The Prima Facie Case,
31 IND. L. REv. 413, 413 n.1 (1998) (claiming that substantial number of recent Title VII
discrimination claims have involved claims of "reverse discrimination").
' See infra Part III.A.
' See infra Part III.B.
396 [Vol. 33:389
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agency and (b) the meaning of charity. Part II discusses the vari-
ous Supreme Court cases indicating that an agency's statutory au-
thority is generally limited to its realm and how these cases neces-
sarily question the legal legitimacy of the Treasury's public policy
power. Part III analyzes various federal and state sources of public
policy on affirmative action, demonstrating that there is no estab-
lished public policy against appropriate affirmative action. 6 Fi-
nally, this Article concludes that the Supreme Court's recognition
of a broad-based public policy power within the Treasury was inap-
propriate and should be either judicially or legislatively eliminated.
Congress, not the Treasury, should either (1) expressly provide by
statute that charities must comply with "established public policy"
or (2) outlaw subordinating racial discrimination by all tax-exempt
charitable entities, not just social clubs as it did in 1976.27 Alterna-
tively, the Court should narrowly interpret the Treasury's public
policy power as applying only to discrimination against groups that
have historically suffered racial repression, such as blacks and
other people of color.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TREASURY'S PUBLIC POLICY POWER
To place discussion of the implications of the Treasury's public
policy power in its proper context, one first needs to examine the
origins and parameters of that power. This Part provides a brief
overview of tax-exempt charitable status and a detailed analysis of
the public policy power set forth in Bob Jones University.
A. Overview of Tax-Exempt Charitable Status
The federal government imposes an annual tax on the periodic
income of a variety of legal entities, including individuals, corpora-
" This Article reserves for another day the question of what happens when (or if) the
tides change such that there is a national uniform policy against affirmative action.
" See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 462-63 (D.D.C. 1972) (concluding that,
while provision of tax exemption for section 501 (c) (7) social clubs does not come within
scope of Tide VI, provision of tax exemption for section 501 (c) (8) fraternal organizations
and provision of tax deductions for section 170(c) charitable contributions are grants of
federal financial assistance within scope of Title VI). But see Bachman v. American Soc'y of
Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp 1257, 1265 (D.N.J. 1983) (concluding that tax exemption
alone is not "federal financial assistance" rendering organization as whole subject to Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973).
39720001
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tions, trusts, and estates. Imposition of this federal income tax
dates back to the late nineteenth century.2 Beginning in 1913,
Congress enacted the first statutory exemption from the federal
income tax imposed on corporations. 30 Today, that exemption, as
contained in section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code"), exempts income earned by, inter alia, charities, business
leagues, social clubs, and fraternal orders.3 ' By far, the most privi-
leged of the tax-exempt entities are charities, which are described
in section 501(c) (3).32 Charities are among the few tax-exempt
entities that are both exempt from the federal income tax and enti-
tled to receive tax-deductible contributions from the public.3 For
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (1999) (imposing tax on taxable income of individuals, trusts and
estates); id. § 11 (imposing tax on taxable income of corporations).
" See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (providing that "nothing herein
contained shall apply to . . . corporations, companies, or associations organized and con-
ducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes"). The Supreme Court de-
clared this income tax enacted in 1894 unconstitutional in 1895. See Pollock v. Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). However, that decision was recently overruled.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524 (1988).
' See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (exempting from tax "any
corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual").
31 Section 501(a) of the Code provides:
(a) Exemption from taxation. - An organization described in subsection (c) or
(d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless
such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
I.R.C. § 501 (a) (1994); see also I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (charitable organizations); id. § 501 (c) (4)
(social welfare organizations); id. § 501(c) (5) (labor organizations); id. § 501 (c)(6) (busi-
ness leagues); id. § 501 (c) (7) (social clubs); id. § 501 (c) (8) (fraternal beneficiary societies);
id. § 501(c)(10) (domestic fraternal societies); id. § 501(c)(13) (nonprofit cemetery compa-
nies); id. § 501 (c) (14) (mutual credit unions).
"Charities" are described as entities or funds that are:
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... ,
and which does not participate in, or intervene in ... , any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id. § 501 (c) (3).
" The tax deductions for contributions are allowed pursuant to section 170 of the
Code, which provides that there "shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution
... payment of which is made within the taxable year." Id. § 170(a)(1) (1994). The few
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an entity to obtain tax-exempt charitable status, it must be organ-
ized and operated for charitable purposes and refrain from certain
prohibited acts. 34
Under section 501(c) (3) of the Code, the Treasury may grant
charitable status to organizations whose charitable purposes in-
clude testing for public safety, fostering amateur sports competi-
tion, preventing cruelty to children or animals, and advancing re-
ligion, science, literature, or education.5 Additionally, entities
serving other public benefit functions may qualify for tax-exempt
charitable status even if the entity does not serve one of the specifi-
cally delineated purposes identified in section 501 (c) (3). s6 Some
of these charitable purposes have included protection of the envi-
ronment," operation of a public interest law firm, or engaging in
certain community development activities. 9 Collectively, these
unspecified charitable purposes emanate from contemporary and
historical understandings of the catchall term "charitable."4°
The term "charitable" also adds another requirement to both the
specifically delineated and the unspecified purposes. To be recog-
nized as charitable under section 501 (c) (3), charities may not vio-
exceptions where entities other than section 501 (c) (3) charities are entitled to income tax
exemption as well as the right to receive tax-deductible contributions from the public are
certain veterans organizations (§ 170(c)(3)), fraternal organizations (§ 170(c)(4)), and
cemetery associations (§ 170(c) (5)). The one exception of when a charity is not entitled to
receive tax-deductible contributions from the public is organizations that "test[] for public
safety." These public safety testing organizations are not described in the deductibility pro-
visions. See generally id. § 170; Hopkins, supra note 11, at 233 (describing tax status of public
testing organizations).
See I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3). The prohibited transactions include substantial lobbying,
political campaign activities, private benefit and inurement transactions. See id.
See id.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1999). This regulation specifically provides
the following:
(2) Charitable defined. The term "charitable" is used in section 501 (c) (3) in its
generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as lim-
ited by the separate enumeration in section 501 (c) (3) of other tax-exempt
purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed
by judicial decisions.
Id.
7 SeeRev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152.
See Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152.
See Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 599-601
(1990) (discussing role of federal income tax on not-for-profit organizations); Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enteiprises, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 883-84 (1980) (discussing appli-
cability of charitable deductions).
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late "established public policy."4' This requirement, however, is not
specifically set out in the Code.42 Instead, the public policy re-
quirement is an agency-created doctrine that received the blessing
of the United States Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United
States in 1983. Because the Treasury is responsible for initially de-
ciding if an entity is charitable under section 501 (c) (3), the public
policy requirement significantly enhances the Treasury's power.
4 3
B. Birth of The Public Policy Power
1. Bob Jones University
The Supreme Court's first official pronouncement that the
Treasury has the power to utilize "established public policy" oc-
curred in Bob Jones University." The controversy in Bob Jones Univer-
sity evolved out of the Treasury's 1970 decision 45 to challenge the
charitable status of private schools that practiced racial discrimina-
tion in admissions. 46 In January 1970, a federal district court issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") from granting tax-exempt charitable status to a private
school in Mississippi that discriminated against blacks in its admis-
sions policy. 4 7  In response to the preliminary injunction, the IRS
4 See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
' See Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of "Charitable"for Federal Income Tax Purposes:
Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 Hous. L. REv. 587, 590
(1996).
43 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596-97 ("In the first instance, however, the responsibil-
ity for construing the Code falls to the IRS."); Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450
U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (providing that Treasury Regulations must be accorded substantial
deference); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (stating that Court must
defer to administration's implementing congressional mandate); Boske v. Comingore, 177
U.S. 459, 469-70 (1900) (holding that Treasury Secretary's judgment should be upheld
unless clearly inconsistent with law); see also I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1999) (stating that Treasury
Secretary may prescribe rules for enforcement). Despite the 1983judicial mandate in Bob
Jones University that comporting with public policy is a prerequisite to obtaining charitable
status, the Service "has yet to clearly set forth a consistent definition and scope of what con-
stitutes a fundamental public policy." John W. Lee et al., Capitalizing and Depreciating Cyclical
Aircraft Maintenance Costs: More-Trouble-than-It's-Worth?, 17 VA. TAx REv. 161, 230-31 (1997).
The failure to define what a fundamental public policy is has the effect of enabling the
Treasury to retain unbridled discretion (i.e., power) to determine what is and what is not
qualified to receive tax-exempt charitable status solely due to a public policy violation.
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586.
I.R.S. News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
§ 6,790.
6 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
17 See id. at 1140. Later the district court permanently enjoined the IRS from granting
charitable status to any school in Mississippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of non-
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issued a news release indicating that it could not "legally justify"
granting charitable status to private schools that racially discrimi-
nate, nor could it allow tax deductions for contributions to such
schools." The IRS later notified all private schools, including Bob
Jones University, of its new tax policy and issued a revenue ruling
49notifying the general public of the same.
The Treasury's newly adopted tax policy adversely affected Bob
Jones University, a private educational and religious institution
established as a tax-exempt charity in 1952.50  Bob Jones
University's charitable purpose was to "conduct an institution of
learning.... giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and
the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures."5' Claiming reliance on
these religious motivations, Bob Jones University discriminated
against blacks in its admissions policies.52
On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked Bob Jones University's
charitable status based on the university's discriminating prac-
discrimination. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
' See I.R.S. News Release, supra note 45.
'9 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 578. The revised policy on discrimination was formal-
ized in Rev. Rul. 71-447:
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the
statutory requirement of being "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable,... or educational purposes" was intended to express the basic com-
mon law concept [of "charity"] .... All charitable trusts, educational or other-
wise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be ille-
gal or contrary to public policy.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, clarified in Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834, and superseded
by Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The Treasury later attempted to revoke Revenue Rul-
ing 71-447 and to recognize an exemption for discriminatory private schools. However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enjoined the Treasury from granting
charitable status to any school that discriminated on the basis of race. See Wright v. Regan,
656 F.2d 820, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1981), revd on other grounds, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984). Thereafter, the Treasury discontinued its attempt to revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447.
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585 n.9.
'o See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579 n.4, 580.
5' Id. at 579-80.
BobJones University discriminated against blacks in two respects. First, the university
completely excluded blacks from admission until 1971. Second, in 1975, in response to a
court decision prohibiting exclusion from private schools based on race, the university per-
mitted blacks to enroll. See id. at 580 (citing McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.
1975)). In McCrary v. Runyon, the Fourth Circuit held that racial exclusion from private
schools is illegal. See 515 F.2d 1082, 1085 (4th Cir. 1975). However, the university contin-
ued its discriminatory acts by denying admission to persons engaged in interracial dating or
marriage. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 580-81.
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ticesi5 The revocation was retroactive to 1970 when the IRS first
officially notified Bob Jones University of the change in tax policy.
54
Bob Jones University then filed federal unemployment tax returns
for the period from 1970 to 1975,55 paying a portion of the tax due
and immediately requesting a refund. 56 After the Treasury denied
its refund request, Bob Jones University filed suit in federal district
court seeking to recover the unemployment tax paid to the IRS,
and the Treasury counterclaimed for the unpaid portion of the
tax.57 The district court ordered the Treasury to refund Bob Jones
University's unemployment tax, concluding that the Treasury's
revocation exceeded its delegated authority and violated the
school's First Amendment religious rights.5 8 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded to the
district court, ordering it to dismiss the refund claim and reinstate
the Treasury's counterclaim. 59 Relying on charitable trust doctrine,
the court of appeals held that a charitable entity must be "charita-
ble in the common law sense" to maintain exemption.60 The court
reasoned that Bob Jones University was not charitable because its
discriminatory admissions policies violated a "clearly defined pub-
lic policy" against racial discrimination. 6' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.62
" See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581. This Article assumes that a university such as Bob
Jones University would be entitled to I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) status as an educational institution,
but for its discriminatory practices. Thus, the addition of a nondiscrimination requirement
is viewed herein as an additional charitable element beyond those specifically enumerated in
section 501 (c) (3).
See id. Although exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) until 1970, the IRS notified Bob
Jones University on November 30, 1970, of its new antidiscrimination policy and its intent to
challenge the charitable status of private schools that discriminate. See id. The university's
attempt to enjoin the IRS from revoking its charitable status was thwarted by the United
States Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). There, the Court
held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421 (a), prohibited injunctive relief before
assessment or collection of tax. See Bobjones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749.
' Charitable organizations described in § 501(c) (3) and exempt from income tax via §
501 (a) are not subject to federal unemployment tax. See I.R.C. § 3306(c) (8) (1999).
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581-82. Bob Jones University paid $21.00 in unem-
ployment tax for one employee for the calendar year 1975. See id.
" See id. at 582. The Treasury counterclaimed for $489,675.59, plus interest, in unpaid
unemployment taxes for 1971 through 1975. See id.
m See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639
F.2d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 1980), affd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
See Bob Jones Univ., 639 F.2d at 155.
See id. at 151.
6' See id. In Bob Jones University, the court stated that BobJones University did not meet
this requirement because "[Bob Jones University's] racial policies violated the clearly de-
fined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning racial discrimination and, more
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The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Treasury ap-
propriately denied Bob Jones University's refund request. The
Court first noted that, although the plain language of section
501 (c) (3) does not mention a public policy requirement, Congress
intended tax exemption to depend on certain common-law stan-
dards of charity.63 Principally, these charitable trust law standards6
require that an entity seeking charitable status must "serve a public
purpose and not be contrary to established public policy." 5 Next,
the Court concluded that an established national public policy ex-
ists against racial discrimination in education. The Court based
this conclusion on such notable events as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,6 Congress's passage of civil rights laws in the 1960s and
1970s,67 and various executive orders issued between the 1940s and
early 1980s.6 The Court noted that with each of these acts the fed-
specifically, the government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education,
public or private." Id. (citations omitted).
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585. Although the Court in Bob Jones University ad-
dressed situations involving both Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools,
Inc., this Article will only address those arguments and matters pertaining to Bob Jones
University. See id. at 583-85.
See id. at 585-86.
For a contrary view, see Gustafsson, supra note 42, at 644-48, which argues that the
charitable trust law definition of "charitable" should not have been adopted for federal
income tax exemption and deductibility of contribution purposes.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586.
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from
denying admission to prospective students because they were African American); Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973) ("[A] private school - even one that discriminates
- fulfills an important educational function; however, . . . [that] legitimate educational
function cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices .... [D]iscriminatory treatment
exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process."); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1964) (holding school district enjoined from operating system of
private schools supported by public funds, while closing free public schools in county, and
excluding students from private schools on account of race); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19
(1958) ("The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools ... is
indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of
law.").
6' See, e.g., Tides IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6,
2000d (1994) (providing that members of class of persons similarly situated are entitled to
equal protection of laws and may not be denied admission to or prohibited from continuing
attendance at public college by reason of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; prohi-
bition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination
under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national origin); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994) (stating that race, color, or previous condition
not permitted to affect right to vote); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §
3601 (1994) (providing fair housing within constitutional limitations).
6 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981) (establishing procedures for
handling complaints of employment discrimination); Exec. Order No. 11,764, 3 C.F.R. 849
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eral government sought to eradicate racial discrimination in edu-
cation and other areas.
Finally, the Court addressed the Treasury's authority to make
public policy determinations.69 In concluding that the Treasury
did not exceed its delegated interpretive authority by utilizing its
public policy power without express congressional authorization,
the Court noted that the Treasury was merely engaging in a type of
anticipatory rule making.70 The Court observed that the Treasury
often exercises its interpretive authority to "meet changing condi-
tions and new problems" regarding tax." For example, in 1921 the
Treasury adopted a rule prohibiting political activities by charities
before Congress added such a prohibition to the language of sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) .7  Moreover, the Court reasoned that legislative
events occurring after the Treasury's adoption of the public policy
power in 1970 "make out an unusually strong case of legislative
acquiescence . . .and ratification" by Congress.7 3 These post-1970
(1971-1975) (establishing uniform policies and procedures for grants administration in
Department of Commerce); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970) (establishing
additional steps to assure equal employment opportunity in federal government); Exec.
Order No. 11,197, 3 C.F.R. 278 (1964-1965) (establishing President's Council to assist fed-
eral departments and agencies to eliminate discrimination and promote equal opportunity);
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963) (prohibiting racial discrimination in
housing); Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1954-1958) (ensuring compliance with
federal antidiscrimination standards in school desegregation programs); Exec. Order No.
9,988, 3 C.F.R 726, 729 (1943-1948) (prohibiting racial discrimination in classifications for
Selective Service); Exec. Order No. 9,980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (194-1948) (prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in federal employment decisions).
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596-602.
See id. at 596-97; see also David A. Brennen, The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regula-
tions: Is the Treasury Department "Sleeping with the Enemy"?, 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 63
(1996) (arguing that anticipatory rule making may appear to be "contrary to an executive
agency's nonlegislative role of executing, not writing, the law," but Court precedent indi-
cates that this type of agency action by the Treasury does not necessarily result in an im-
proper rule).
" Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596.
n See id. The Court majority states that:
[flor more than 60 years, the IRS and its predecessors have constantly been called
upon to interpret these and comparable provisions, and in doing so have referred
consistently to principles of charitable trust law. In Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 517(1)
(1921), for example, the IRS denied charitable exemptions on the basis of pro-
scribed political activity before the Congress itself added such conduct as a
disqualifying element.
Id. at 597. A similar event occurred in 1997 when Congress codified the Treasury's then-
existing proposed regulations governing corporate sponsorship arrangements. See I.1RC. §
513(i) (1999).
7 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 599.
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events included Congressional hearings on the Treasury's antidis-
crimination policy,74 failed legislative attempts to invalidate the pol-
icy, 5 and legislative adoption of the policy, in section 501 (i), 76 for
noncharitable, tax-exempt social clubs. 7
'4 See, e.g., Administration's Changes in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially
Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong.
(1982); Equal Educational Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Education
Opportunity, 91st Cong. (1970); see also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600 (discussing Congress's
failure to enact legislation to overturn IRS interpretation of § 501 (c) (3)).
See, e.g., H.R. 1096, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 802, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 498, 97th
Cong. (1981); H.R. 332, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 95, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 995,96th Cong.
(1979); H.R. 1905, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 96, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 3225, 94th Cong.
(1975); H.R. 1394, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 5350, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 2352, 92d Cong.
(1971); H.R. 68, 92d Cong. (1971); see also BobJones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600. The Court notes
that there were at least 13 bills introduced to overturn the Treasury's adoption of the anti-
discrimination policy in Revenue Ruling 71-447. See id.
"6 See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601-02 (stating that "Congress affirmatively manifested
its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it enacted the present § 501 (i) of the Code, Act of
October 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976)"). Section 501 (i) provides:
(i) Prohibition of discrimination by certain social clubs. - Notwithstanding sub-
section (a), an organization which is described in subsection (c) (7) shall not
be exempt from taxation under subsection (a) for any taxable year if, at any
time during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or other governing instru-
ment, of such organization or any written policy statement of such organiza-
tion contains a provision which provides for discrimination against any person
on the basis of race, color, or religion. The preceding sentence to the extent
it relates to discrimination on the basis of religion shall not apply to -
(1) an auxiliary of a fraternal beneficiary society if such society -
(A) is described in subsection (c) (8) and exempt from tax
under subsection (a), and
(B) limits its membership to the members of a particular
religion, or
(2) a club which in good faith limits its membership to the members of a
particular religion in order to further the teachings or principles of
that religion, and not to exclude individuals of a particular race or
color.
I.R.C. § 501(i).
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601. Social clubs are exempt via section 501 (c) (7) of
the Code:
(c) List of exempt organizations. - The following organizations are referred to in
subsection (a):
(7) Clubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable pur-
poses, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes
and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder.
I.R.C. § 501 (c) (7).
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2. Analysis of Bob Jones University
The Court's adoption of the Treasury's public policy power in
Bob Jones University is flawed for several reasons. Notably, support in
English charitable trust law is tangential and abstract at best.78 Fur-
ther, the Court did not cite a single statement in the legislative his-
tory to section 501 (c) (3) mentioning the public policy require-
ment.79 In fact, the only tangentially related floor debate noted by
the Court is a brief statement by Senator Hollis: "For every dollar
that a man contributes to these public charities, educational, scien-
tific, or otherwise, the public gets 100 percent."8 0  This isolated,
abstract comment does not evidence a congressional purpose that
charities must not act inconsistently with "established public pol-
icy." "' Third, scholars82 and courtsss question the use of trust law
See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588-89. In fact, the only textual reference to the Eng-
lish law upon which the opinion is based is a statement of Lord McNaghten. See id. at 589.
McNaughten stated that "charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts
for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement
of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any
of the preceding heads. Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] App. Cas. 531, 583.
'9 See Bob Jones Univ. at 586-88 & n.12 (citing H.R. RP. No. 91-413, at 35 (1969), re-
printed in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1680). The House Report provides that section 501 (c) (3)
exemption is available to entities that serve "the specified charitable purposes ....." H.R.
REP. No. 91413, at 35 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.CAN. 1645, 1680. The House Report
describes "charitable" as "a term that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds of
years." See id. at 43.
'o Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590 (citing 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen.
Hollis)). This is obviously a reference to the section 170 deduction rules, and not to the
exemption standards of section 501 (c) (3). The majority views the charitable standards for
sections 170 and 501 (c) (3) as identical. See id. at 586-87. However, it never responds to
Justice Rehnquist's remarks in his dissent that, "[slince § 170 is no more than a mirror of §
501(c) (3) and ... § 170 followed § 501(c) (3) by more than two decades.., it is at best of
little usefulness in finding the meaning of § 501(c)(3)." Id. at 614 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (providing that "statements
by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect," but rather, such statements
are to be respected only to the extent that they "are consistent with the statutory language");
see also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 63-64 (1983) ("Neither the text of the Code nor the legislative history be-
fore the IRS' 1970 ruling seemed to compel [the Court's] interpretation.").
" See, e.g., Galston, supra note 14, at 292 (concluding that "trust law does not provide
the theoretical foundation for public policy constraints in the area of federal tax law");
Gustafsson, supra note 42, at 647 (arguing that charitable trust law definition of "charitable"
should not have been adopted for federal income tax exemption and deductibility of con-
tribution purposes).
a' See, e.g., International Reform Fed'n v. District Unemployment Bd., 131 F.2d 337,
342-46 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Miller, J., dissenting) ("There is no necessary identity between the
indicia of a charitable trust and those of a charitable purpose which will exempt an agency
from taxation."); Schuster v. Nichols, 20 F.2d 179, 181 (D. Mass. 1927) (concluding that
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concepts in tax settings. These authorities reason that the pur-
poses and effects of granting an organization tax-exempt charitable
status are very different from the purposes and effects of uphold-
ing the validity of charitable trusts.8 4 Thus, the Court mistakenly
extended trust law's definition of "charitable" to tax law.
85
Another problem with Bob Jones University is that the Court did
not address the limits of the Treasury's ability to determine when
or if a particular "public policy" is sufficiently "established" in any
context other than whites discriminating against blacks. For ex-
ample, the Court did not discuss the acceptability of affirmative
action programs. The Treasury might view these programs as con-
trary to established race policies because they similarly involve ra-
cial preferences, albeit for blacks instead of against them. 6 Indeed,
in the constitutional law context the Court has held that there is no
difference between discrimination against blacks and so-called be-
term "charitable" signifies corporations organized and operated solely for "eleemosynary
purposes").
See generally Gustafsson, supra note 42, at 601-02 (noting effects of granting tax ex-
emption and allowing deduction for contributions). The purpose of the term "charitable"
in trust law is to ensure that trusts intended to benefit the public are not defeated due to
violation of the rule against perpetuities, thus preserving the "public benefit" aspect of the
trust. The effect of 'charitable" for trust law purposes "was to allow conveyances in trust for
charitable purposes to be valid despite the rule against perpetuities and the rule against
indeterminate beneficiaries." Id. at 593-94.
Cf Merkel v. Commissioner, 192 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to define
term "liability" for tax law purposes in same way that term is defined for bankruptcy law
purposes). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provided:
The dissent urges... that we adopt a construction [for tax law purposes] which
would define "liability" as including all liabilities discounted by the probability of
their occurrence .... As sound as the economic policy outlined by the dissent
may be, however, it is not the law Congress enacted when it sought to "accommo-
date" bankruptcy policy with tax policy. Unlike [in bankruptcy law], the definition
of insolvency in the Internal Revenue Code expressly requires a fair market valua-
tion of assets only and not liabilities.
Thus .... the dissent.., departs from the plain meaning of the statute by imbuing
it with an economic analysis neither express in the statutory language nor sup-
ported by an examination of congressional intent. Indeed, in seeking to import a
valuation mechanism in reliance upon five cases from other circuits decided ex-
clusively in the "bankruptcy context," the dissent fails to recognize, as Congress
clearly did, that tax policy is distinct from bankruptcy policy.
Id. at 850-51.
" See e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics 1: The Myth of the Protected Class in
Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv. 441,446 (1998).
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nign discrimination against whites." The Treasury might ignore
the fact that many of the public policy sources relied on by the
Court in Bob Jones University involved discrimination by whites
against blacks and not preferences for blacks. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the very public policy sources
cited in Bob Jones University, while facially neutral, were and are
primarily motivated by the desire to eradicate discrimination by
whites against blacks.88
The Bob Jones University Court also failed to outline clearly the
scope of the Treasury's anticipatory rule making power.89 Even if
the Court is correct that the Treasury can, in anticipation of con-
gressional acceptance, impose rules that at the time of adoption
have no clear statutory basis, such anticipatory action is not bound-
less. Indeed, such action must be restricted to matters pertaining
to Congress's original grant of interpretive authority.90 Thus, even
if the Treasury can properly engage in anticipatory rulemaking, the
matters that are the subject of that rulemaking must logically have
a substantial, not merely circumstantial, relationship to tax. True,
the Court's assertion that there was an established public policy
against racial discrimination against blacks in 1970 is accurate. But
the outcome in Bob Jones University does not, without more, justify
the Court's conclusion that the Treasury, and not Congress or the
president, is the appropriate governmental body to decide what is
established public policy.9'
Although Congress was aware of the Treasury's adoption of an
antidiscrimination policy for charities, the Court erred in finding
that Congress's post-1970 actions "ratified" the Treasury's public
87 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978); see also Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225-26 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to "benign" and nonbenign racial classifications); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
940 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) ("Furthermore, there is now absolutely
no doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classifications,
including those characterized by their proponents as 'benign' or 'remedial.'").
See discussion infra Part III.B and cases discussed therein.
See discussion infra Part II.
See Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 60, 75 (1990) ("We will not
read a requirement into the Code that income must be derived from passive sources when
Congress has not chosen to include such a requirement."), rev'd on other grounds, 942 F.2d
309 (6th Cir. 1991).
" See discussion infra Part II. Additionally, neither during the 14 years between the
Treasury's adoption of the public policy power in 1970 nor in the intervening 16 years since
the Court recognized that power in Bob Jones University in 1983, has Congress enacted any law
which would codify the Bob Jones University result.
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policy power.92 Neither the hearings nor the legislative proposals
following Bob Jones University resulted in enactment of any laws that
either prohibit racial discrimination by 501 (c) (3) charities or that
generally grant the Treasury the authority to act on public policy
grounds.93 The hearings and failed legislation only show, at most,
that Congress was aware of the public policy controversy. Aware-
ness is a far cry from outright adoption or ratification by Congress
of the Treasury's view that discriminating charities should not have
tax-exempt charitable status.9"
Further, prior to 1970, Congress rejected a proposal to amend
section 501 (c) (3) of the Code to provide the Treasury with express
statutory authority to deny charitable status to organizations that
discriminate based on race.95 In 1965, a bill was submitted to Con-
gress that proposed to amend the Code "to provide that an organi-
zation described in section 501 (c) (3) ... which engages in certain
discriminatory practices shall be denied an exemption."9 6 This bill
failed to become law. 97 Congress's rejection of an antidiscrimina-
See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court And The Demise of The Free
Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 1, 100 (1997) (describing Bob Jones
University as "turning more upon the notice the Court took of the blatantly discriminatory
policy of the University's recent past, when it admitted whites only, than on its rather
strained finding of Congress' 'legislative acquiescence' to the IRS policy").
Subsequent hearings and legislative proposals suggest:
The only support in legislative history for the Bob Jones University result was Con-
gress' behavior after the IRS' 1970 ruling. The Court's reliance on congressional
inaction is quite interesting in light of the Court's nearly simultaneous invalida-
tion of the legislative veto... It is difficult, then, to see why congressional "acqui-
escence" in a regulatory move of the sort recounted in Bob Jones University, can
have any legal force. Depending on the circumstances, congressional acquies-
cence in an administrative interpretation may be more or less probative evidence
of what congressional intent was at the time the statute in question was passed.
Given that § 501 (c) (3) was enacted decades before the IRS' 1970 ruling and with-
out consideration of the issues raised by that ruling, Congress' acquiescence in
the ruling hardly demonstrates the enactinglegislature's intent.
Cover, supra note 81, at 63-64 n.188 (citations omitted).
" See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 110 (1976) (recognizing that congres-
sional and presidential awareness of controversy surrounding Civil Service Commission's
adoption of rule prohibiting aliens from all federal civil service jobs is not equivalent to
outright approval or adoption of CSC's rule by either Congress or president).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90
n.143 (1988) (citing H.R. 6342, 89th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 5140
(1965)).
Id.
H.R. 6342 was introduced to the House and sent to the House Ways & Means Com-
mittee. See A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Provide that an Organization
Described in Section 501(c)(3) of Such Code Which Engages in Certain Discriminatory Practices Shall
20001 409
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 409 1999-2000
University of California, Davis
tion amendment to section 501 (c) (3) indicates Congress's "acqui-
escence in exactly the opposite interpretation" than that posited by
the Bob Jones University Court.98 Thus, Bob Jones University is viewed
as internally inconsistent with respect to the issue of acquiescence.
99
In contrast to the congressional hearings and failed legislation
addressing tax exemptions for charities engaged in race discrimi-
nation, Congress's passage of an antidiscrimination policy for so-
cial clubs is a clear indication of Congress's willingness to prohibit
racial discrimination when it so chooses.'00 Congress's limitation of
the "no discrimination" rule to social clubs demonstrates a lack of
congressional support for expansion of the antidiscrimination pol-
icy to other categories of tax-exempt entities, including charities.
Additionally, Congress's focus on discrimination policies in a social
club's "governing instruments" and "written policy statements" is
arguably a curtailment of the Treasury's power in seeking out dis-
crimination violations.10' That Congress expressly limited the bases
upon which the Treasury could revoke a social club's tax-exempt
status indicates that Congress did not want to give the Treasury
plenary authority over discrimination issues.
In sum, the scope of the public policy power outlined by the
Court in Bob Jones University is unclear. Although the Court cau-
tiously stated that violation of a given public policy must be "estab-
lished," it set no clear boundaries for the Treasury to determine
when a policy other than discrimination against blacks is suffi-
ciently established." Thus, the question remains: what is the scope
and relevance of Bob Jones University today?' 3
Be Denied an Exemption, H.R. 6342, 89th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 5140
(1965). However, a search of the Congressional Index and the Congressional Record does
not reflect that the bill ever emerged out of the House Ways and Means Committee.
' See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 90-91; see also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby,
Race, Religion & Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 9
(stating that hearings were never held on bill because it had so little support in legislature).
" See Eskridge,Jr., supra note 95, at 90.
'0 See I.R.C. § 501(i) (1999). In his dissent in Bob Jones University, Justice Rehnquist
notes that "it seems to me that in § 501 (i) Congress showed that when it wants to add a
requirement prohibiting racial discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully
aware of how to do it." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 621 (1983)
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
"' SeeI.R.C. § 501(i).
" See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592. The Court stated:
We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that determina-
tions of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implica-
tions for the institutions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not
410 [Vol. 33:389
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II. DELEGATION OF PUBLIC POLICY POWER BY CONGRESS
A. Extent of Treasury's Statutory Authority over Tax Matters
Bob Jones University stands for the proposition that the Treasury
Department may determine when acts of private tax-exempt firms
become contrary to public policy.10 4 The scope of an agency's in-
terpretive power is ordinarily defined by Congress and may exist
only within limits established in the Constitution.105  Thus, the
Treasury's power to discern public policy - with respect to race or
in any other context - must first fall within the ambit of the Con-
stitution and, second, must find affirmative support in congres-
sional statutes.10 6 This Article now focuses on congressional legisla-
tion as a possible source for the Treasury's interpretive authority.
0 7
"charitable" should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity
involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy.
Id.
10 See discussion infra Part III (addressing breadth of Bob Jones University holding relative
to prohibiting all forms of race based discrimination, including so-called benign discrimina-
tion).
See supra Part I.B.1.
z' Pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine, Congress cannot constitutionally delegate
its legislative authority to an administrative agency without also providing some limits as to
the scope of that authority. Thus, as Justice Breyer recently noted, "[t]he 'nondelegation'
doctrine represents an added constitutional check upon Congress' authority to delegate
power to the Executive Branch." Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
'06 In outlining the limits of Congress's authority to delegate legislative power to an
executive administrative agency, Justice Breyer states:
The Constitution permits Congress to "seek assistance from another branch" of
Government, the "extent and character" of that assistance to be fixed "according
to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-
ordination." But there are limits on the way in which Congress can obtain such
assistance; it "cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the
limitation of a prescribed standard." . . . [T]he Constitution permits only those
delegations where Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible princi-
ple to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform."
Id. (citations omitted).
It is important to note that this part is not a commentary on the power of the Treas-
ury to act on racial matters involving its own, as opposed to its regulated entities', opera-
tions. This Article recognizes that, while the Treasury is not statutorily authorized to gener-
ally decide questions of "established public policy" with respect to charities, it is required to
abide by various employment and other laws relating to race with respect to its own opera-
tions.
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1. Treasury's Role as an Administrative Agency
Congress charges the Treasury with the obligation to interpret
the tax laws.'08 The Treasury fulfills this interpretive role in a vari-
ety of ways, some that are binding on the Treasury and others that
are not.109 Thus, on matters properly involving tax, the Treasury's
authority may indeed be supreme.
In its interpretive capacity, the Treasury often enacts rules that
relate directly to tax matters, such as defining income and defining
deductions. In the early 1990s, for example, the Treasury enacted
a rule regarding corporate sponsorship arrangements and their
connection to the unrelated business income tax.10 Under Con-
gress's statutory directive that a charity's unrelated trade or busi-
ness income is subject to tax,"' the Treasury enacted regulations
that defined the term "trade or business" to include advertisements
conducted via certain corporate sponsorship arrangements. 1 2 But
the Treasury's interpretive authority regarding tax matters is not
plenary." 3 In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an
lO, Section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other
than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall pre-
scribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this tide, including
all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in
relation to internal revenue.
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1999).
" For example, a Treasury official's verbal statement that catching a record-setting
home run baseball is not an income realization event may not legally bind it to that position
in court. See, e.g., Tom Herman, Tax Report: Politicians Slug an IRS Screwball Pitch Out of the
Par*, WALL. ST.J., Sept. 9, 1998, at Al (citing statement issued by IRS Commissioner Charles
Rossotti stating that catching Mark McGwire's historic record-breaking home run ball and
returning it to Mr. McGwire would not constitute a taxable event). However, if the same
statement is made in written form via a revenue ruling or regulation, it may be binding on
the Treasury and may obligate a court to defer to the Treasury's position, if challenged. See,
e.g., David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-Chevron Era, 13
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconcil-
ingDivergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1062 (1995).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993); see also Brennen, supra note
70, at 50-62 (arguing that Treasury's authority to define statutory term "trade or business" by
regulation is limited to any of broad range of reasonable interpretations).
.. See I.R.C. § 511 (1999).
M See Prop. Treas. Reg § 1.512, 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (1993).
"' See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 301 (noting that questions concerning religion and civil
rights "are far afield from the more typical tasks of tax administrators - determining tax-
able income").
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administrative agency's authority is generally limited to that
agency's congressionally authorized sphere of expertise."
4
2. An Agency's Interpretive Authority Is Limited to Defined
Areas of Expertise
Congress empowers an agency to assist it on a limited range of
matters. If this were not the case, Congress could simply utilize
"generalist" administrators with plenary authority over any subject
matter."" Wisely, this is not the preferred method of lawmaking in
most democratic societies, nor is it the route of governing in the
United States."6 Our legal history is replete with examples of the
Court invalidating agency action primarily because the agency's
action involved matters outside its statutorily authorized area of
See, e.g., Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 510 n.17 (1983) (suggest-
ing that because FCC's duties derive specifically from Communications Act, courts should
look to provisions in that statute to discern scope of agency's duties); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114 (1976) (providing that Civil Service Committee should conduct
activities within its area of expertise); NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670
(1976) (stating that words "public interest" in Gas and Power Acts do not permit Federal
Power Commission to try to eliminate discrimination, but, rather, direct it to encourage
production of gas and energy supplies at reasonable rates); see also Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d
1206, 1220 (2d Cir. 1992) (declining to give deference to agency interpretation of statute
where "agency's position is not based on any expertise in the statute's realm"); Flores v.
Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that because child welfare is not area of
INS expertise, "its decisions in this area are not entitled to deference"); Process Gas Con-
sumers Group v. FERC, 930 F.2d 926, 935 (D.C. Cir 1991) (describing how, like FPC, FERC
lacks jurisdiction to prohibit employment discrimination by its regulatees). The D.C. Circuit
noted:
Although "the [Federal Power] Commission has authority to consider ... envi-
ronmental ... questions," this authority is limited "to those areas in which the
agency fairly may be said to have expertise." There is little in the record indicat-
ing that FERC has "expertise" in determining the pollution-reducing effects of
natural gas vehicles.
Id. (citations omitted).
. See American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating
that nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to establish parameters of an agency's statu-
tory authority).
116 See, e.g., Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 101 ("We do not agree... with petitioners' pri-
mary submission that the federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the Na-
tional Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules
from those applied to citizens."); see also flores, 942 F.2d at 1355 (commenting that "Congress
has delegated the duties of the administration of the immigration laws to the Attorney Gen-
eral, who oversees the work of the Immigration and Naturalization Service").
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expertise."7 One such invalidation occurred in NAACP v. Federal
Power Commission. 
1 8
NAACP v. FPC concerned the power of the Federal Power Com-
mission ("FPC") to prohibit discrimination in employment prac-
tices by its regulated entities. The petitioner, the NAACP, urged
the FPC to invoke its "public interest" regulatory authority to man-
date that those subject to FPC regulation require equal employ-
ment opportunities and nondiscriminatory employment."9 The
FPC refused, reasoning that it had "no jurisdiction" to adopt the
proposed rule because the purposes of its empowering legislation
were "economic regulation of entrepreneurs engaged in resource
developments." °20 The FPC failed to find the "necessary nexus be-
tween those aspects of [their] economic regulatory activities and
the employment procedures of the utility systems which [they]
regulate, as would justify [adopting petitioners' proposed rule]."'
On review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit agreed that FPC could not prescribe and enforce detailed
personnel policies. 2 2  However, the court of appeals concluded
that the FPC could consider evidence that a regulated entity has
demonstrated that it discriminates in employment matters when
performing its properly authorized regulatory functions. 22  For
example, "costs incurred by reason of a [regulated entity's] choos-
ing to practice racial discrimination are within the reach of that
responsibility." 124 Thus, the court of appeals vacated the FPC's
.. See, e.g., Community Television, 459 U.S. at 510 (holding that absent specific Congres-
sional directive, FCC cannot take jurisdiction over, or process charges against, regulatees
violating Rehabilitation Act); Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 105 (reasoning that ability of Civil
Service Commission to deny application for employment based on noncitizen status must be
specifically delegated by Congress or president); NAACP, 425 U.S. at 670 (holding FPC
cannot regulate employment discrimination of its regulatees without clear Congressional
direction).
.. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
19 See id. at 664. The proposed rule would require the FPC to refer a complaint indicat-
ing probable violation of certain civil rights laws to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 432, 448-51 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
affd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
'20 NAACP, 425 U.S. at 664.
... Id. (citing 48 F.P.C. 40, 44 (July 11, 1972)).
NAACP, 520 F.2d at 435.
n Id,
1 Id. at 444. The appellate court continued:
Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of such costs, we identify at least
the following as indicative of those arguably within the Commission's range of
concern: (1) duplicative labor costs incurred in the form of back pay recoveries by
[Vol. 33:389414
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order and remanded the case back to the agency to clarify when it
had been demonstrated that a regulated entity discriminates in
employment.2 5 Both NAACP and FPC appealed.
The Supreme Court first noted that the issue was not "whether
the elimination of discrimination in our society is an important
goal" or "whether Congress could authorize the [FPC] to combat
such discrimination." 27  Rather, the Court declared that the issue
concerned whether the legislative obligation to advance the "pub-
lic interest" under the Power and Gas Acts constituted a command
to advance the public interest in general and allowed the FPC to
prohibit employment discrimination by regulated entities. 128  The
Court answered a resounding no: "[The] cases have consistently
held that the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory stat-
ute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare.
Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the regula-
tory legislation. " '29 In this case, the Court concluded that the pur-
pose of the Power and Gas Acts is "to encourage the orderly devel-
.opment of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at rea-
sonable prices."' ° Because the legislative purpose of these acts did
not evidence an intention to eliminate employment discrimination
employees who have proven that they were discriminatorily denied employment
or advancement, (2) the costs of losing valuable government contracts terminated
because of employment discrimination, (3) the costs of legal proceedings in ei-
ther of these two categories, (4) the costs of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts
aimed against [regulated entities] because of employment discrimination, (5) ex-
cessive labor costs incurred because of the elimination from the prospective labor
force of those who are discriminated against, and (6) the costs of inefficiency
among minority employees demoralized by discriminatory barriers to their fair
treatment or promotion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 447.
See NAACP, 425 U.S. at 665.
I2 Id.
See id. at 665-66.
" Id. at 669. In explaining what it meant by its statement that "the words ['public in-
terest'] take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation," the Court turned to
the former Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and its responsibilities. Id. The Court
noted that the ICC "is responsible for enforcing an Act 'designed ... to assure adequacy in
transportation service... .'" Id. Further, in the context of ICC enforcement, "the term
'public interest'.., is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to
adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and
to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities...." Id. (citing New York
Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)). Thus, a contextual meaning of
the word "public interest" requires resort to the purpose for which the statute was adopted.
Id. at 669-70.
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by entities regulated by the FPC, regulation of employment dis-
crimination was outside the scope of the FPC's expertise.' s Thus,
the Court concluded that the FPC rightly refused to accept the
NAACP proposed rule.3
NAACP has great significance for purposes of defining the scope
of Treasury's public policy power. Although Congress created the
FPC's "public interest" power and the Court created the Treasury's
public policy power, NAACP teaches that the scope of such power is
limited to the purposes of the regulatory legislation and the
agency's expertise. In this case, Congress authorizes the Treasury,
via the Internal Revenue Code, to collect tax revenues 33 More-
over, nowhere in the legislative history of the Internal Revenue
Code is there evidence of a congressional purpose for the Treasury
to regulate public policy issues such as discrimination.'34 In fact,
even section 501(c) (3), from which the Court implied the public
policy power, does not evidence such an intent.'35 Indeed, the
relevant language of section 501 (c) (3) describes tax-exempt chari-
ties as entities or funds that are:
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, sci-
entific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to chil-
dren or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation .... and which does
not participate in, or intervene in . . ., any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
36
Thus, finding congressional authority for the Treasury to prohibit
racial discrimination by its regulated entities (charities) requires
two hermeneutic leaps: first, the word "charity" must be read to
. See id. at 670.
... See id. at 671.
See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1999).
" See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 615 (1983) (RehnquistJ., dissent-
ing).
... See id. at 612-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part I.B.2.
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (1999).
416 [Vol. 33:389
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modify "educational" and, second; "charity" must be read to mean
consistent with "established public policy."
In Community Television of Southern California v. Gottftried,37 the
Court also recognized that the scope of an agency's authority is
often limited to the agency's area of expertise. Community Televi-
sion involved the Court's review of the Federal Communication
Commission's ("FCC") decision to renew a public television sta-
tion's broadcast license without regard to the station's alleged vio-
lation of a statute administered by another federal agency. The
petitioner alleged that the subject public television station violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973138 by discriminating
against the hearing impaired. 3 9 Another federal agency, however,
administered the Rehabilitation Act, not the FCC.14 Thus, the is-
sue was whether, pursuant to its statutory duty to protect the "pub-
lic interest," the FCC was required to consider possible violations of
a non-FCC administered law. 141
At the administrative review level, the FCC recognized the im-
portance of encouraging the communication industry to serve the
17 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
See id at 500. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provided:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate au-
thorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no ear-
lier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted
to such committees.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1976).
' See Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 500-01 (1983). The petitioner
alleged "[t]hat the television station] has violated, and remains in violation of [the Act] ...
in that [it] has received and is receiving Federal financial assistance and has discriminated
and is discriminating against the Petitioners 'solely by reason of [their] handicap'. . .. " Id.
at 501 n.2.
"* See id. at 509-10 n.15 (describing series of executive orders that transferred enforce-
ment power of section 504 from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to Depart-
ment ofJustice).
" See id. at 506-08. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994) (describing FCC's general
statutory duty to protect public interest).
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needs of the hearing impaired. 42  The FCC also agreed that it
should consider an alleged violation of section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act in license renewal proceedings. 14 3  However, the FCC
"saw no reason to consider section 504 in the absence of an adverse
finding by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -
'the proper governmental agency to consider such matters."" Ab-
sent such findings, however, the FCC concluded that neither its
failure to adopt a rule requiring "captioning" for the hearing im-
paired nor the failure of licensees to provide "captioning" without
a rule was a violation of its duty to protect the "public interest." 45
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit va-
cated the renewal of the public television station's license.1M The
court noted that: "[a]s a recipient of federal financial assistance,
the public station was admittedly under a duty to comply with sec-
tion 504."147 Although the court did not hold that the public televi-
sion station violated section 504, it concluded that the "public in-
terest" standard of the Communications Act required the FCC to
consider a violation of section 504 where the licensee was covered
by that section.'" Thus, the court held that "the [Federal Commu-
nications] Commission could not find the service of public stations
'to be adequate to justify renewal without at least inquiring specifi-
" See Community Television, 459 U.S. at 503-04 (explaining historical development of
FCC policy encouraging service to hearing impaired).
, See id. at 505 (referring to FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order, 69 F.C.C. 2d 451
(1978)).
Id (quoting 69 F.C.C. 2d 451, 459 (1978)).
' See id. at 506. The Court quoted a recent FCC memorandum opinion and order:
We find no error and nothing inconsistent in concluding that licensees are serv-
ing the public interest although they are not currently providing captioning, in
view of the fact that we have not required licensees to undertake such an activity.
Furthermore, to judge a licensee's qualifications on the basis of the retroactive
application of such a requirement would, in our opinion, raise serious questions
of fundamental fairness. Thus, there is no inconsistency or error in our finding
that the subject licensees had met their public interest burden even though they
did not caption their programming.
In re Renewal Applications - Los Angeles, Calif., 72 F.C.C. 2d 273, 279 (1979).
' See Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Community
Television v. Gotfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
W Id. at 301 (stating that "the challenge to the license renewal of public station KCET-
TV must be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings").
'a See id.
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cally into their efforts to meet the programming needs of the hear-
ing impaired.'
1 49
The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals
opinion requiring the FCC to "inquir[e] specifically" into a public
station's efforts to comply with a non-FCC statute. 5  The Court
recognized that the "public interest" is served by making television
broadcasting more accessible to the hearing impaired. 5 However,
the Court focused on Congress's intention, or lack thereof, with
respect to having the FCC enforce a statute that was administered
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.15 The
Court found nothing in the legislative history to section 504 indi-
cating that it was "intended to alter the Commission's standard for
reviewing the programming decisions of public television licen-
sees.
" l5 s
Although the Treasury's public policy power does not necessarily
require the Treasury to interpret statutes administered by another
agency, it does permit the Treasury to make final decisions that are
more appropriately made by other branches of government, such
as the judiciary. With regard to discrimination, the Treasury's duty
under the public policy power closely resembles that of a court
determining whether a particular act constitutes discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause. However, several problems
'" See id. In his dissent, Judge McGowan wrote that section 504 should not apply to the
public television stations unless and until "regulations had been issued by the Department of
Education dealing specifically with the rights of access of the hearing impaired to television
programs." See id. at 316-17 (McGowan, J., dissenting). Judge McGowan noted that public
television stations had no "advance notice during their expired license terms of what was,
and therefore could reasonably be, expected of them with respect to the wholly laudable,
but technically complex, objective of providing access for the hearing impaired." Id. at 317.
Community Television, 459 U.S. at 509-11.
's' See id at 508.
152 See id. at 509. The Court provided:
We are not persuaded, however, that Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to impose any new enforcement obligation on the Federal Communications
Commission. As originally enacted, the Act did not expressly allocate enforce-
ment responsibility. Nevertheless, since § 504 was patterned after Titie VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was understood that responsibility for enforcing it, in-
sofar as it regulated private recipients of federal funds, would lie with those agen-
cies administering the federal financial assistance programs. When the Act was
amended in 1978, that understanding was made explicit. It is clear that the
Commission is not a funding agency and has never been thought to have respon-
sibility for enforcing § 504.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
"' See id. at 509-10.
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arise when the Treasury is obligated to make such a determination.
First, how can the Treasury, an agency charged with tax administra-
tion, make "the most exacting [] examination" required to deter-
mine when a specific type of racial discrimination is unlawful?1
4
The Treasury's attempt to make a court-like determination is also
strained by the fact that certain discriminatory acts violate the
Equal Protection Clause, while others do not necessarily do so.155
Indeed, if the alleged unlawful racial preference is supported by a
compelling governmental interest and the method of preference is
narrowly tailored to accomplish that interest, the Court has held
that the racial preference is lawful.
56
Second, and even more problematic, is whether the Treasury can
competently apply this constitutional public policy standard to non-
constitutional settings. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
is to prevent government from overreaching and treating individuals
unfairly.57  To what extent should private parties be held to the
same standard as state actors? Is there a constitutional standard as
applied to a private nongovernmental charity?15  One possible re-
sponse is that private entities are intended to be subject to statutory
" See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (stating that "racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial examination").
'' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372
(1991) (finding that prosecutor's peremptory challenges did not violate Equal Protection
Clause by excluding Latino potential jurors due to claimed uncertainty whether they would
accept interpreter's translation).
" See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995) (explaining that
federal racial classifications are constitutionally permissible as long as they serve important
government objectives).
17 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970); see also Graham v. Tennessee
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:95-CV-044, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3211, at *31 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20,
1995) ("The regulatory framework proscribing discrimination by tax-exempt organizations
was likely intended to prevent the U.S. Government from becoming entangled with and
promoting private organizations that engage in discriminatory practices, rather than to
protect individuals in private schools from discrimination.").
'm See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia specifically provides:
The Government, in its briefs to this Court, at least purports to address the conse-
quences of its attack on VMI for public support of private single-sex education. It
contends that private colleges that are the direct or indirect beneficiaries of gov-
ernment funding are not thereby necessarily converted into state actors to which
the Equal Protection Clause is then applicable. That is true. It is also virtually
meaningless.
Id. (citations omitted).
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civil rights laws. 59 Civil rights laws, however, are subject to en-
forcement, not by the Treasury, but by appropriate civil rights
agencies like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") or other agencies that provide federal financial assis-
tance.'" Thus, we are left with a situation almost identical to that
involved in Community Television - an agency interpreting a regula-
tory scheme that it has not been legislatively authorized to inter-
pret.
In another regulatory case, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 6 the
Court reaffirmed its philosophy that agencies are governmental
entities of limited and not plenary authority. Mow Sun Wong in-
volved a Civil Service Commission ("CSC") regulation that limited
eligibility for federal civil service jobs to citizens of the United
States and natives of American Samoa.1 62 CSC's asserted national
interests for the citizenship rule included providing an incentive
for aliens to become naturalized citizens and providing the presi-
dent with an additional tool in treaty negotiations. Pursuant to this
rule, CSC denied a *niumber of noncitizen applicants seeking fed-
eral government employment positions. '6s The applicants sued
M See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)) (eliminating exemption of colleges and
universities from Title VII prohibition on employment discrimination).
While Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be applied to private actors receiv-
ing federal "financial assistance," charitable status alone may not be enough to constitute
"financial assistance" for purposes of Title VI. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,
462 (D.D.C. 1972) (concluding that provision of tax exemption for section 501 (c) (8) frater-
nal organizations and deductions for section 170(c) charitable contributions are grants of
federal financial assistance under Title VI). But see Bachman v. American Soc'y of Clinical
Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (D.N.J. 1983) (concluding that tax exemption alone is
not "federal financial assistance," thereby subjecting organization to section 504 of Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994). But see Graham, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *31 (suggest-
ing that, if section 1983 plaintiffs are "not likely to succeed on their discrimination claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment; Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and the Tennessee
Human Rights Act .... there is no reason to believe that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed
on their discrimination claims under § 501 (c) (3) and its regulatory framework").
'6' 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
6. See id. at 90-91; see also 5 C.F.R. § 338.101(a) (1999). Section 338.101 (a) specifically
states that "[a] person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a citizen of
or owes permanent allegiance to the United States." Id.
"' See Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 91. There are exceptions to the citizenship rule in the
case of certain types of civil service jobs. See 5 C.F.R. § 338.101(b). Section 338.101(b)
provides:
(b) A person may be given an appointment in the competitive service only if he
or she is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
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CSC in federal district court seeking to invalidate the rule on the
ground that it violated their Fifth Amendment due process
rights.' 4
The district court upheld the citizenship rule, reasoning that the
federal government's near plenary power over aliens justified the
rule because the rule serves the economic security of the nation by
only permitting citizens to make federal policy. 16  The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed and invalidated the rule, reasoning that the economic
security justification only relates to a small number of federal civil
service jobs (e.g., those involving national security or policymak-
ing).' 6 Thus, the citizenship rule could not indiscriminately ex-
clude aliens from all federal civil service jobs, without regard to the
particular job's relation to the asserted interests sought to be pro-
tected.'67
The Supreme Court affirmed.1ss The Court rejected CSC's claim
that "federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the
National Government may arbitrarily subject aliens to different sub-
stantive rules from those applied to citizens."169 Instead, because
aliens, as a group, are persons who are disadvantaged politically
and socially, "some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated
However, a noncitizen may be given an appointment in rare cases under §
316.601 of this chapter, unless the appointment is prohibited by statute.
Id, Section 316.601 outlines appointments that can be made without competitive examina-
tion. See5 C.F.R § 316.601 (1999). Section 316.601 states:
(a) An agency may make an appointment without competitive examination
when:
(1) The duties and compensation of the position are such, or qualified
persons are so rare, that in the interest of good civil service admini-
stration the position cannot be filled through open competitive ex-
amination;
(2) The person to be appointed meets all applicable qualifica-
tion requirements for the position; and
(3) The appointment is specifically authorized by the Office or is
made under an agreement between the agency and the Of-
fice providing for such appointments.
I&
See Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 92-93.
' See Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 532 (N.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 500
F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), affd, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
' See Mow Sun Wong, 500 F.2d at 1037.
167 See id.
SeeMowSun Wong, 426 U.S. at 117.
' Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33:389
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 422 1999-2000
The Power of the Treasury
by the Constitution."'70 Moreover, the Court noted that the level of
judicial review depends on the scope of the agency's delegated au-
thority." ' The Court noted that if an agency with "direct responsi-
bility" for serving a particular national interest promulgates a rule,
it will be presumed that the agency's "asserted interest" is the basis
for the rule.172  Further, if Congress or the president mandates
agency adoption of a rule, the Court will presume that the basis of
the rule is "any interest" that might be served.7 7 The Court rea-
soned that because CSC's asserted interests for the rule are "so far
removed" from CSC's "normal responsibilities," the Court refused
to presume that these "asserted interests" formed the basis for the
citizenship rule.74
Although noting that CSC could enact a citizenship rule pursu-
ant to its delegated authority17' and administrative convenience
could justify such a rule, the Court concluded that CSC asserted no
appropriate justification for the citizenship rule.76 CSC's purpose
and expertise is to "adopt and enforce regulations which will best
promote the efficiency of the federal civil service." CSC's area of
expertise does not include foreign affairs, treaty negotiation policy,
immigration policy, or naturalization policy. 77 In adopting a blan-
ket prohibition of aliens in federal employment, CSC made no
showing that it utilized its expertise. 17 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded, the citizenship rule resulting from these improper justifica-
tions was invalid. 79 In short, the Mow Sun Wong Court established
that, even where an agency has adopted a rule consistent with pub-
lic policy, that rule may still be invalidated as ultra vires if it is out-
side the agency's expertise.
"0 Id. at 102-03.
171 See id. at 105.
1' See id. at 103.
"" See id.
l7, Id. at 105.
"" See id. at 113. Congress charged CSC with responsibility to promulgate regulations
"as will best promote the efficiency" of CSC. See5 U.S.C. § 3301(1) (1994). Further, the
president authorized CSC "to establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education,
training and experience, suitability,... or other requirements which applicants must meet"
to be eligible for federal employment. Exec. Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R 218, 219 (1954-
1958), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994). Per the Court, each of these state-
ments of authority clearly indicates that CSC "may retain or modify the citizenship require-
ment without further authorization." Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 113.
176 Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114-15.
Seeid atll5-16.
See id at 115.
Seeid. at116-17.
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 80 Justice Powell
indicated a similar limitation on state agency power to make cer-
tain racial findings.'8' Bakke involved the Supreme Court's review
of a state medical school's special admissions program that consid-
ered the applicant's economic background and race.182 Under this
program, the school did not admit any white and economically
disadvantaged applicants.8 3 A rejected white male applicant sued
the school alleging that the special admissions program excluded
him on the basis of his race in violation of federal and state consti-
tutional provisions and federal civil rights laws. 8 4 The California
Supreme Court held that the special admissions program violated
the Equal Protection Clause and ordered the medical school to
admit the white applicant.
8
5
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical school's
special admissions program impermissibly discriminated against
the white applicant. 6 In a plurality opinion,Justice Powell empha-
sized that the medical school established its special admissions
program to remedy specific acts of prior discrimination, not gen-
eral societal discrimination. While recognizing the importance of
l" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
181 See id. at 309; see also Brian K. Landsberg, Balanced Scholarship and Racial Balance, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 819, 822 (1995) (discussing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke).
112 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-75. Under the regular admissions program applicants with
undergraduate grade point averages below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were automatically rejected.
Several of the nonrejected applicants were evaluated for admissions purposes based on
various criteria, none of which included race of the applicant. The criteria included inter-
view performance, overall grade point average, science grades, medical school admissions
test scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical
data. Under the special admissions program, applicants did not have to meet the 2.5 grade
point cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the regular admissions process.
Among the factors used to determine an applicant's eligibility for the special admissions
program was the applicant's disadvantaged economic status and the applicant's membership
in one of several racial minority groups. See id.
" See id. at 276.
See id. at 276-78. Bakke, the plaintiff, alleged that the "special admissions program
operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Art. I, § 21, of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d." Id. at 277-78.
18 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 55, 553 P.2d 1152, 1166 (1976)
(footnote omitted) (holding that Equal Protection Clause required that "no applicant may
be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by
standards applied without regard to race").
1S6 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that race could be
taken into account in future admissions. See id. (concluding that "so much of the California
court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant
must be reversed").
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the state's interest in "ameliorating ... the disabling effects of
identified discrimination," Justice Powell noted that "remedying of
the effects of 'societal discrimination' [is] an amorphous concept
of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past." 87 Thus, a
governmental entity seeking to justify "a classification that aids per-
sons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals" must make 'Judicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory viola-
tions."'" Absent such findings, it cannot be said that 'the govern-
ment has any greater interest in helping one individual than in
refraining from harming another.""9
Justice Powell never evaluated the medical school's findings of
specific acts of discrimination because that entity lacked the au-
thority and ability to do so:
Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position
to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the
formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of par-
ticular claims of illegality .... [I] solated segments of our vast gov-
ernmental structures are not competent to make those decisions,
at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively de-
termined criteria. Before relying upon these sorts of findings in
establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have
the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the
classification is responsive to identified discrimination. Lacking
this capability, petitioner has not carried its burden of justifica-
tion on this issue.' 90
Together, Mow Sun Wong and Bakke demonstrate that agencies
cannot formulate and execute broad social policy on matters that
the particular agency does not have the authority or capability to
establish. In no case may an administrative agency whose expertise
is in taxation regulate discrimination, an area clearly foreign to
taxation, without specific guidance from an appropriate sphere of
government. Just as CSC in Mow Sun Wong could not act on certain
personnel matters without appropriate authorization and the
'"' Id. at 307. Interestingly, the Court in Bakke, like the Court in Bob Jones University,
refers to its earlier ruling in "the line of school desegregation cases commencing with Brown
[v. Board of Education]" as support for this proposition. Id.
I' !d.
"' Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 309-10 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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medical school in Bakke could not make certain racial findings re-
garding prior specific acts of racial discrimination, so too should
the Treasury not be permitted to decide complex issues involving
race without legal authority.
B. Segments of Government Equipped to Make Public Policy Decisions
Even assuming that the Treasury could, consistent with the Con-
stitution and statutory authority, determine the nation's public
policy on race matters, other segments of government are better
equipped to make such decisions. As suggested by justice Powell in
his concurring opinion in Bob Jones University, Congress may be best
equipped to determine the nation's public policy on race.' 9' In-
deed, as Justice Powell observed, the balancing of all the "substan-
tial interests" at stake in deciding what policies are "established" is
ordinarily a congressional function.9 2 In deciding where to strike
the balance, Congress is empowered to conduct legislative hearings
and examine societal perspectives and determine, for example,
whether appropriate race-based affirmative action is necessarily
against public policy. Moreover, democratic processes, not present
in agency rulemaking, better ensure that Congress's striking of this
balance is reflective of the populace."93
Aside from Congress, there are several executive agencies that
routinely decide policies on race and may, therefore, be better
suited to decide race policies.9 4  For example, EEOC is charged
... See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 611 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell provides:
[T]he balancing of these substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am
unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with
authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently 'fundamental' to require
denial of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce
revenue for the Government, not to promote "public policy."
Id. (citation omitted).
1" See id.
... This is not to suggest that Congress would necessarily come to the correct conclu-
sion. However, given the passion voters generally have about racial issues, any conclusion
arrived at by Congress would, ideally, be reached only after thoughtful and careful consid-
eration.
" Interestingly, the IRS itself apparently questions the advisability of a tax agency mak-
ing these often complicated nontax determinations. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862
(Nov. 22, 1991) ("Where the courts and the administrative agency responsible for adminis-
tering a nontax statute have not spoken to its application to a particular arrangement, we
should not rush to do so unnecessarily."); IRS ExEMPT ORGANIZATION TEXTBOOK, supra note
4, at § 5.
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with interpreting and enforcing many of our nation's civil rights
laws aimed at eradicating employment discrimination. 95 Addition-
ally, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") en-
forces various portions of the Civil Rights Act.96 In the course of
such enforcement, EEOC and HHS have developed expertise at
evaluating factual situations and determining their compliance, or
noncompliance, with current policies on race. Although EEOC
and HHS administrators may not be as responsive to the polity as
Congress, these entities are better equipped to determine policies
on race than the Treasury.
Despite the fact that other agencies are better suited to deter-
mine what race policies and practices violate established public
policy, Bob Jones University vests this power exclusively in the Treas-
ury. The implication of the Court's decision in Bob Jones University
is that the Treasury has authority to utilize its public policy power
in various contexts beyond organizations' discrimination against
blacks. Could, for example, the Treasury revoke the tax-exempt
charitable status of an organization that participated in affirmative
action? In other words, could the Treasury turn Bob Jones University
on its head and determine that affirmative action programs are
against established public policy? Part III addresses these questions
and related issues.
III. USE OF PUBLIC POLICY POWER TO INHIBIT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Ignoring, for the moment, whether the Treasury is the appropri-
ate governmental body to decide if a charity violates an established
-public policy standard, a more immediate concern is: How should
the Treasury apply this standard in light of the contemporary juris-
prudential environment? For example, should the policy be ap-
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
9 Title VI authorizes federal agencies to issue and to enforce implementing regulations
in order to effectuate § 2000d by either terminating federal assistance or by any other means
authorized by law. See id. § 2000d-1. The attorney general is responsible for coordinating
the compliance and enforcement of Tide VI by federal agencies through the implementa-
tion of rules and regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. § 298 (1981), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Pursuant to this mandate, the attorney general issued 28 C.F.R.
Part 42, Subpart F which serves "to insure that federal agencies which extend financial assis-
tance properly enforce title VI." 28 C.F.R. § 42.401 (1999). HHS then acted to develop
Title VI implementing regulations. See generaUy 45 C.F.R pt. 80 (1999). These regulations,
which provided for compliance with Title VI, were made applicable "to any program for
which Federal financial assistance is authorized to be extended to a recipient under a law
administered by [HHS] .. . ." 45 C.F.R. § 80.2.
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plied to revoke or deny tax-exempt charitable status to an organiza-
tion that chooses to provide scholarships only to blacks? 197 How
should the Treasury deal with complaints of wrongful discrimina-
tion in reaction to affirmative action programs? Part III concludes
that, for a variety of legal and policy reasons, the Treasury should
not use its public policy power as a basis for revoking or denying
tax-exempt charitable status to private organizations that engage in
appropriate affirmative action efforts.
A. Established Public Policies on Race
In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court outlined a somewhat
workable (albeit troublesome)' 9" process for the Treasury to de-
termine whether a policy was sufficiently established tojustify deny-
ing an entity's tax-exempt charitable status.'9 In finding that there
was a national public policy against discriminating against blacks,
the Bob Jones University Court relied on several sources of discrimi-
nation law and policy, including judicial, executive, and legislative
statements of law and policy.2°° Indeed, the Court found that, in
the field of public education, discrimination against blacks is not
only strongly discouraged, but also clearly unlawful.' This conclu-
sion was no doubt influenced by the ever-present notion that
whites had long discriminated against blacks.0 2 Because of this
historical discrimination, blacks as a group were clearly economi-
cally and socially disadvantaged when the Treasury revoked Bob
Jones University's tax-exempt charitable status.03 Although af-
firmative action programs have been implemented to remedy this
'9' See, e.g., Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 759, 770-73 (1995) (arguing that Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995), was correctly decided under then-existing constitu-
tional precedent and under then-current public policy considerations). In Podberesky v.
Kinwan, the Fourth Circuit held that a race-exclusive scholarship program at a public univer-
sity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Podberesky v.
Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
See discussion supra Part II.
" See discussion supra Part I.
"' See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593-95, 599-601 (1983) (looking to
Civil Rights Act of 1964, case law, Executive Orders issued by Presidents Truman, Eisen-
hower, and Kennedy, as well as House and Senate Committee Reports articulating policy
against racial segregation in private clubs).
See id. at 593-95.
See id. at 604-05.
See id. at 595.
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situation, it is arguably no different today.20 4 However, as this sub-
part will show, the United States has no uniform national policy
against appropriate affirmative action, even when the result of the
affirmative action is that a black person is preferred over a white
205person.
1. Definition of "Affirmative Action"
The phrase "affirmative action" is a reference to positive efforts
taken in the pursuit of social justice objectives in the areas of race,
gender, religion, and like aspects of social being. ° President Ken-
... See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN 2 (1998) ("Over the second half of the 20th century, black Americans
have made substantial progress relative to whites in many areas. But this progress generally
slowed, or even reversed, between the mid-1970's and the early 1990's."). Studies show that
as a result of lower income and less participation in literacy activities, black children are less
likely to have a computer at home, score lower on achievement tests than their white coun-
terparts, and are less likely to complete some form of higher education (despite marked
increase since 1980). See id. at 13-14. Additionally, the unemployment rate for blacks is
twice as high as for whites, holding at over 10% for more than 20 years; 20% of young black
men are neither working nor in school, as compared with 14% of Hispanic men and 9% of
white men. See id. at 23. In addition, the relative pay for black men and women in the work-
force has decreased in the past 10 years, after rising in the 1960's and 1970's. See id.; see also
John Bound & Richard B. Freeman, Wat Went Wrong? The Erosion of Relative Earnings and
Employment Among Young Black Men in the 1980s, 107 Q. J. OF ECON. 201, 201-02 (1992)
(discussing salary decline over last few decades for black men); RoderickJ. Harrison & Clau-
dette E. Bennett, "Racial and Ethnic Diversity", in 2 STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE
1990'S, 141 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995) (discussing population and marriage trends in
United States).
SeeJoyce A. Hughes, "Reverse Discrimination" and Higher Education Faculty, 3 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 395, 406 (1998) (indicating that, of various cases involving "reverse discrimina-
tion" claims by white faculty members at predominantly white higher educational institu-
tions, no plaintiff prevailed, suggesting "the unstable foundations of such claims").
See Philip L. Fetzer, "Reverse Discrimination": The Political Use of Language, 12 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 212, 213 (1993); Carl L. Livingston,Jr., Affirmative Action on Triak The Retraction of
Affirmative Action and the Case For Its Retention, 40 HOw. L.J. 145, 146-47 (1996). Various
commentators have defined the phrase "affirmative action." See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, The
Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 503
(1982) (describing affirmative action as "a public or private program designed to equalize
hiring and admission opportunities for historically disadvantaged groups by taking into
consideration those very characteristics which have been used to deny them equal treat-
ment"); James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment:
Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IOwA L. REV. 901, 903 (1985) (characterizing af-
firmative action as "public or private actions or programs which provide or seek to provide
opportunities or other benefits to persons on the basis of, among other things, their mem-
bership in a specified group or groups"); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Com-
ment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 n.1 (1986) (defining af-
firmative action as "policies that provide preferences based explicitly on membership in a
designated group").
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nedy first used the term in 1961 when he issued an Executive Or-
der requiring government contractors to "take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin."207  Later, in 1995, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights formally defined "affirmative action"
as,
[a]ny measure, beyond simple termination of a discriminatory
practice, that permits the consideration of race, national origin,
sex, or disability, along with other criteria, and which is adopted
to provide opportunities to a class of qualified individuals who
have either historically or actually been denied those opportuni-
ties and/or to prevent the recurrence of discrimination in the fu-
ture.&
Thus, affirmative action typically refers to any policy or program
that allocates opportunities or resources to members of historically
subordinated groups. 2°  Race-based affirmative action may, then,
accord opportunities to qualified blacks that might otherwise go to
qualified whites.
It is this latter possibility - a qualified black being provided an
opportunity that might otherwise go to a qualified white - that
produces the concept of "reverse discrimination," a highly charged
political term emanating in part from former President Reagan's
first presidential campaign in 1976.210 "Reverse discrimination"
generally refers to an alleged preference of one person over an-
other where the preferred person is a member of a traditionally
subordinated group (like blacks) and the person not preferred is
not a member of the traditionally subordinated group (like
'7 See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959-1963). Others have referred to
Executive Order 11,246, signed by President Johnson in 1965, as the first major use of the
term "affirmative action." See, e.g., Livingston, Jr., supra note 206, at 147. Executive Order
11,246 provides that "[t]he contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-
1965), nprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Briefing Paper on Affirmative Action [1995], Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at D-47 (Aug. 1, 1995).
m See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1160-70 (discussing various methods and
goals of affirmative action).
.. See generally Fetzer, supra note 206, at 215-17 (discussing popular and legal origins of
term "reverse discrimination").
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whites) .2Il Although this Article does not discuss the acceptability
of the phrase, there is some doubt as to whether these claims of
wrongful discrimination against whites are discrimination at all or
simply a means of politicizing the affirmative action debate.12
2. Current Public Policy Regarding Race-Based Affirmative
Action
Contemporary debates regarding affirmative action raise the
possibility that the Treasury Department might view an organiza-
tion's affirmative action efforts as a type of racial discrimination
and rely on those efforts as a basis for denying or revoking an or-
ganization's tax-exempt charitable status.2 '  These contemporary
occurrences may be collectively referred to as affirmative action
retrenchment efforts. Affirmative action retrenchment arguably
began in 1978 when the Supreme Court invalidated U.C. Davis
" See id. Professor Fetzer notes:
[A] uthors of law review articles have adopted a wide variety of explanations of the
term ["reverse discrimination"]. It may mean: (a) "discrimination against mem-
bers of the white majority," (b) "[p]referential hiring policies" or "affirmative ac-
tion," (c) "many different things to different people," (d) "code words to express
emotional or ideological support or opposition," (e) "the removal of that benefit
which American society has for so long bestowed without question, upon its privi-
leged classes," and (f) "[prejudice or bias exercised against a person or class for
the purpose of correcting a pattern of discrimination against another person or
class."
Id. at 216 (alteration in the original) (footnotes omitted).
1 See id. at 215-17.
"' In fact, in 1999 the Internal Revenue Service issued an unpublished Technical Advice
Memorandum ("TAM") to a private charitable trust that explicitly approved of the trust's
preference for Hawaiians, over Caucasians and other non-Hawaiians, as beneficiaries. The
end of the TAM contains the following language: "[A]fter the Supreme Court issues its
decision in [the appeal of Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998)] the estate should
consider requesting a private letter ruling on whether the decision has any affect on the
analysis and decision contained in this TAM." See Tech. Advice Mem. (issued to Kame-
hameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate) (unpublished) (Feb. 1999) (on file with
author); see also Milton Cerny, Federal Public Policy: The IRS Historic Challenge to Racially
Discriminatory Private Schools, American Bar Association Section of Taxation, 2000 Midyear
Meeting Materials, January 21, 2000, available in LEXIS, ABA Library, ABA Tax File (stat-
ing that "[iln light of this [TAM] and the United States Supreme Court review of Rice v.
Cayetano, it would be well to revisit the application of the public policy doctrine as it ap-
plies to the exemption of organizations described in section 501 (c) (3)" (citations omit-
ted)). The United States Supreme Court recently held in Rice v. Cayetano that Hawaii's
denial of voting rights to non-Hawaiians is a racial classification that violates the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000).
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medical school's affirmative action admission plan in Bakke.1 4
Many viewJustice Powell's opinion in Bakke, however, as represent-
ing a political compromise between those who would have the law
blind to race and those who believe the law should embrace racial
diversity.215 Indeed, under Bakke, affirmative action plans that allow
the consideration of race factors are not necessarily unlawful. 6
Recent decisions, however, cast some doubt on the constitutional-
ity of such plans.
a. Federal Constitutional Public Policy
Regardless of whether one accepts Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke as the beginning of affirmative action retrenchment, the Su-
preme Court has clearly narrowed the permissible scope of affirma-
tive action programs. Most notably, in 1995, the Court decided
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, holding that federal, state and
local government affirmative action efforts are subject to strict
scrutiny review when challenged under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments.
217
Prior to Adarand the Court could not settle on the appropriate
level of judicial review of government affirmative action plans. In
1980, the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick1 8 applied something less
than a strict scrutiny standard21 9 when it upheld a federal minority
.. See Kennedy, supra note 197, at 761 (describing Court's decision in Bakke as evidence
of "vacillating equal protection jurisprudence").
15 See generally RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Robert Post & Michael
Rogin eds., 1998); Kennedy, supra note 197, at 764 (referring to Powell's decision in Bakkeas
"Solomonic compromise").
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 272, 320 (1978). The Court stated:
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however,
the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of
the California court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of
the race of any applicant must be reversed.
Id.
I"' See 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
28 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
219 Strict scrutiny is the standard by which federal courts address government classifica-
tions based on race, as well as those which infringe on fundamental rights. In order to pass
the strict scrutiny test, the government classification must be closely related to a compelling
governmental interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 222-24. This Equal Protec-
tion Clause test is the most difficult for the government to succeed in proving. See City of
Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989). Alternately, where sex- or
[Vol. 33:389
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set-aside statute, reasoning that a court must give "appropriate def-
erence to Congress" when assessing the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute. 220 Later, in 1989, the Court held in Richmond v. J A.
Croson C0.221 that, under the Equal Protection Clause, state and lo-
cal government race-based set-aside programs were subject to strict
scrutiny review, notwithstanding the program's remedial or benign
purpose.2 22  Finally, in 1990, the Court returned to its pre-Croson
stance when it held in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC2 3 that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate for reviewing benign racial classifica-
tions. 24
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, however, the Court yet again
returned to strict scrutiny review of government affirmative action
programs. "Adarand involved an equal protection challenge to
"subcontractor compensation clauses" in federal agency contracts,
which provided that general contractors would receive additional
compensation for hiring minority subcontractors. A white con-
tractor challenged the use of compensation clauses under the
Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the government improperly
226used race as a factor in selecting a contractor. Relying on Ful-
lilove and Metro Broadcasting, the federal district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment,2 27 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 28 On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings. 22 The Court held that all government racial classifications,
alienage-based classification is made, the government must prove that its classification is
substantially related to an important end. This level of scrutiny is termed "intermediate",
the government having to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a preference.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1984)).
Crosen, 448 U.S. at 472.
"' 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See id. at 505. In Croson, a city program required prime contractors to subcontract at
least 30% of the contract amount to "Minority Business Enterprises." See id. at 477. The
Court found this set aside program unconstitutional because there was no evidence of past
racial discrimination to remedy and the set-aside was overbroad. See id. at 508-09.
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
See id. at 596-97 (upholding constitutionality of FCC order which granted more mi-
nority owners radio station licenses and allowed for sale of stations to minority run firms).
". SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).
See id. at 210.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 250 (D. Colo. 1992),
aftfd, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
SeeAdarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.
" SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 239.
20001
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even remedial classifications, must be analyzed under a strict scru-
tiny standard, requiring their invalidation unless they are narrowly
tailored to further compelling government interests. "° The Court,
thus, expressly overruled Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it was
inconsistent with this strict scrutiny requirement.
23'
Although the strict scrutiny standard of review may be regarded
as strict in theory but fatal in fact,2 32 there are some instances in
which government racial preferences may be justified.232  Indeed,
even though "the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence may
have shifted dramatically since [Bakke in] 1978," u a clear majority
of the current Court holds the view that government affirmative
action efforts may withstand constitutional scrutiny under some
circumstances - narrowly tailored plans designed to meet a com-
See id. at 235.
21 See id. at 233-34. The Adarand Court held that "[b]y refusing to follow Metro Broad-
casting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of law; we restore it." Id. at 234 (emphasis
added).
" See id. at 237 (Marshall,J., concurring in judgment) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
' See id. All members of the Court do not appear to share this view. For example,
Justice Scalia has stated:
In my view, government can never have a "compelling interest" in discriminating
on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial discrimination in the op-
posite direction. Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimi-
nation should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.... To pursue the concept of racial en-
titlement - even for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to rein-
force and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race
slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one
race here. It is American.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas
expresses a similar view:
I believe that there is a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence" between laws de-
signed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in
order to foster some current notion of equality.
That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot
provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government
may not make distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is con-
cerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by
those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help
those thought to be disadvantaged.
Id. at 240 (Thomas,J., concurring in part) (citations omitted).
' Livingston,Jr., supra note 206, at 162.
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pelling governmental interest.235 Thus, affirmative action plans that
consequently disadvantage whites are constitutionally permissible
so long as they are designed to remedy prior identifiable discrimi-
natory acts. Accordingly, there is no clearly established constitu-
tional public policy against appropriate affirmative action plans.3 6
The Court in Bob Jones University failed to recognize this prospect
- there are exceptions to the general rule that racial preferences
are always wrong. Indeed, the majority in Bob Jones University states
that "[w]hatever may be the rationale for such private school's
policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimi-
nation in education is contrary to public policy. ,2 37 In all likeli-
hood, "racial discrimination" in Bob Jones University was a reference
to the type of discrimination at issue in that case - invidious dis-
crimination against blacks.2ss Given that the Court decided Bob
Jones University after Bakke, however, one could interpret Bob Jones
University as sanctioning appropriate government affirmative action
policies regarding tax-exempt educational institutions. Thus, a
race-exclusive scholarship offered by a tax-exempt charitable or-
ganization may not violate the Equal Protection Clause, but it may
be within the scope of the Treasury's public policy power.2 3 9
See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212-37, 240-76 (indicating that Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter agree that properly structured
affirmative action programs may withstand strict scrutiny). Adarand reveals that Justice
Scalia is the only justice who believes that affirmative action programs would never be able
to withstand strict scrutiny. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discrimina-
tion on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction.") (emphasis added). Even Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that affirmative
action programs may survive under strict scrutiny when he joined in Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Metro Broadcasting. See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
' This constitutional standards argument is not intended to equate what is constitu-
tional with established public policy. Instead, the argument simply draws on Bob Jones Uni-
versity's use of constitutional law standards as a means of determining whether a particular
policy is established or not. See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-94 (1983)
(holding that public policy will not allow racial segregation in educational facilities after
Court has long since declared racial segregation in general, and specifically in educational
facilities, to be unconstitutional).-
'3 Id. at 595.
See RONALD A. DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 318 (1985) (noting that phrases
like "discrimination against someone because of race" may be used "in an evaluative way, to
mark off racial classifications that are invidious").
In Bob Jones University, the Court failed to recognize that while governmental prefer-
ences for blacks that disadvantage whites may be constitutionally permissible, it is almost
impossible to envision a case in which government discrimination against blacks is ever
constitutional. See Landsberg, supra note 181, at 825 ("Although the Court itself has upheld
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b. Nonfederal Public Policy
Bob Jones University does not foreclose the prospect of the Treas-
ury looking to sources of law and policy beyond federal constitu-
tional law to determine the nation's stance on affirmative action. 4
For example, even though the Bob Jones University Court did not do
so, the Treasury might look to states' positions on affirmative ac-
tion for guidance in determining national policy standards.41
Although states, pursuant to Adarand, must have a compelling
interest to use race as a factor in implementing policies and pro-
grams, they are free to adopt more stringent standards. Thus, a
state could adopt a standard like that suggested by Justice Scalia
(namely, that government never has a compelling interest in enact-
some race-based decisions which disfavor white persons, it is difficult to conceive of a case
today in which the state could show a compelling interest in discriminating against persons
of color."). In recentjudicial history, the Supreme Court has never recognized a compelling
governmental interest in discriminating against blacks. Two factors lend credence to the
fact that no such recognition is likely to occur in the near future. First, remedying specific
acts of past governmental discrimination is the only governmental interest uniformly com-
pelling enough to withstand Court scrutiny. Second, it is rare, if ever, that governmental
entities systematically disadvantage whites because of their race in such a way as to require
some form of remedial action. Thus, the likelihood that the Court will ever recognize a
compelling governmental interest to discriminate against blacks, as might be the case in
something akin to an affirmative action program for whites, is next to impossible.
' See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (providing that nonprofit organization that
violates local law may not qualify for exemption under section 501 (c) (4) of Internal Reve-
nue Code); Gen. Couns. Mem. 31,376 (Aug. 14, 1959) (stating that "contravening state laws
(1) is not in furtherance of exempt purposes, and (2) is contrary to public policy"). The
Treasury has yet to face the issue of a charity violating a state law that contravenes a federal
public policy. See IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.c.
"' In determining how to promulgate a rule, the Treasury could look to the states's
positions on affirmative action for guidance in a similar manner to which the federal courts
look to state law for defining terms, formulating concepts and ideas or delineating policies.
See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 216 (1997) (concluding that standard of conduct for
gross negligence is set by state law); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718
(1979) (adopting "state law as the appropriate federal rule for establishing the relative prior-
ity of [] competing federal and private liens"); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
701 (1973) ("[I]t is, of course, not uncommon for Congress to direct that state law be used
to fill the interstices of federal law."); United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 101-02 (D.
Mass. 1997) (discussing manner in which Congress enacted Travel Act of 1961, referencing
to state law); see also Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 915
(1996) (stating that "a federal court may look to state law for guidance" but has no obliga-
tion to adopt state laws); Wendy E. Russell, State Law in Federal Courts: Implications of De Novo
Review, 60 WASH. L. REV. 739, 743-46 (1985) (discussing Erie doctrine and its implications).
Therefore, in codifying new law, the Treasury would consider various states' positions and,
from there, determine one uniform rule. For an example of a Federal statute that adopts
state law, see Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
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ing race-based remedies).242 While the overwhelming majority of
states have not adopted Justice Scalia's approach to affirmative ac-
tion, many states have or are considering legislation consistent with
this position.4 Of the three states in which voters actually decided
the fate of affirmative action in recent years,2 " however, only two -
California and Washington - have passed laws adopting a position
similar to the Scalia approach.4 5
In 1996 California voters passed Proposition 209, prohibiting the
use of race as a factor in "the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting."24 In 1998 Washington
... See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part) ("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminat-
ing on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction.") (citations omitted).
U4 States that have considered comparable anti-affirmative action positions are: Texas,
New York, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Ala-
bama, Florida, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Arkansas,
Missouri, Minnesota, Ohio, New Jersey, and California. See Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights Online Center: Affirmative Action in the States (visited Nov. 15, 1999)
<www.civilrights.org/aa/state.html> (on file with author); see alsoJennifer Hochschild, The
Strange Career of Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 997, 1005-27 (1998) (discussing electoral
future of affirmative action and predicting that affirmative action will be defeated at polls in
very fewjurisdictions in foreseeable future).
On November 9, 1999, Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed an Executive Order,
termed the "One Florida Initiative," which, if approved by the Board of Regents, eliminates
race and ethnicity of applicants as a factor in the admission process at state universities, in
addition to banning racial preferences (and set-aside programs in contract decisions) in
government departments. See Sue Ann Presley, Forida Plan Aims to End Race-Based Preferences,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 11, 1999, at A15; F/orida Governor Ends Affirmative Action,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at A30. For the text of the order, see FHorida Governor's
Executive Order 99-281 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.state.fl.us/eog/execu-
tive.orders/1999/November/eo99-281.html> (on file with author).
2" See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 209 (West); 1997 Tex. Legis. Serv. Prop. A (West);
1998 Wash. Legis. Serv. Initiative 200 (West); Hochschild, supra note 243, at 1004 (indicating
that California, Texas, and Washington State-have each allowed voters to decide, by referen-
dum, whether their respective states could use race as factor in government functions).
20 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1998) (West Supp.
1999). Professor Hochschild notes that "[iun no state beyond California and Washington
has an anti-affirmative action measure come close to passage." Hochschild, supra note 243,
at 1005.
' CAL. CONST. art I § 31. This provision reads in full:
Discrimination based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin; gender-
based qualifications in public employment, education, or contracting
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
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State voters passed Initiative 200, likewise prohibiting the use of
race as a factor in public operations.2 17  Washington's 1-200 was
closely modeled after California's Proposition 209, both seeking to
end affirmative action programs in their respective states.
2
4 With-. 249.
out regard to one's position on affirmative action, it is clear that
the initiatives passed in California and Washington do not indicate
"without doubt" that states, collectively, have adopted a uniform
250public policy against affirmative action.
Id.
247 SeeWASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.1. The statute specifically provides:
(1) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
Id,
24 Initiative 200, enacted in Washington in 1998, was modeled after California's Propo-
sition 209, banning racial, gender and ethnic preferences in education, contracting, in
addition to state and local public employment positions. See Initiative 200 - Wrong Direction
for This State, SEATrLE TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at B6 (discussing similarities between 1-200 and
CRI 209, which resulted in dramatic drop in minority admissions to state universities); 1-200:
Issue Paper on Initiative 200, Opp. Wash. Att'y Gen. (Oct. 16, 1998) (visited Nov. 13, 1999)
<http://www.wa.gov/ago/pubs/i200.html> (on file with author) (stating that Initiative 200
is similar to Proposition 209, and that California courts' interpretation of Proposition 209
may offer guidance). The driving force behind these two anti-affirmative action statutes, as
well as the current crusade against affirmative action in Florida, was Ward Connerly. Mr.
Connerly, a California businessman who sits on the Board of Regents, pushed for Proposi-
tion 209 in 1996, led Initiative 200 into law in Washington, and now has his sights set for
change in Florida. He is currently spearheading a movement to place an anti-affirmative
measure on the November 2000 state ballot, needing 435,073 signatures to do so. See
Affirmative-Action Foe Stakes New Turf CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1999, at 5; Rick Bragg, Forida Gov-
ernor Offers Plan for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999, at A18; R~orida the Next Battleground
Against Affirmative Action (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http:www.lawstreet.com/journal
/art990315florida-aa.html> (on file with author).
" See Hochschild, supra note 243, at 998 (commenting that individual's position on
affirmative action rarely changes).
' See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983) (stating that "determi-
nations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implications for
the institutions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not "charitable" should be
made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamen-
tal public policy"). Indeed, some states have adopted laws that require government to take
"affirmative action" efforts when making certain types of governmental decisions. For ex-
ample, in Oregon, the state legislature passed Senate Bill 24 in 1997, which included a sec-
tion that requires that procedures for recruitment shall include adequate public notice and
"affirmative action to seek out underutilized members of protected minorities." See SB 24,
69th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1997), OR. REV. STAT. § 240.306 (1998) (enacted).
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c. Conclusions
Given these various aspects of our federal and state jurispru-
dence relating to race, the Treasury should not use its public policy
power to revoke or deny tax-exempt charitable status to organiza-
tions that engage in appropriate affirmative action efforts. The
Court in Bob Jones University clearly stated that the Treasury should
act only pursuant to its public policy power in those cases in which
"there is no doubt" about the policy being enforced.2 5 1 Further, the
Court in its recent constitutional jurisprudence on affirmative ac-
tion has indicated that affirmative action plans are subject to the
most exacting of review.252 While there can be no doubt that dis-
crimination against blacks violates an established constitutional pub-
lic policy on race, there are substantial doubts as to whether af-
firmative action plans violate such a policy. In the latter case,
therefore, Bob Jones University does not authorize the Treasury to
deny or revoke charitable tax-exempt status.
B. Application of Federal Civil Rights Laws
In addition to the evidence that this nation has no uniform pub-
lic policy against affirmative action, civil rights laws contain built-in
safeguards that prohibit discrimination against blacks and other
minority groups.5 s Although civil rights laws apply to discrimina-
tion against whites as well as blacks, the legislative history of these
laws clearly indicates a primary congressional concern regarding
discrimination against blacks.254 Furthermore, in Title VII em-
' Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592 (holding that charitable status ought to be denied
only when organization's purpose is contrary to public policy).
"' See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (stating that "racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial examination").
5 The civil rights laws referred to are those codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
These laws include Title I, addressing voting rights; Title II, addressing discrimination in
public accommodations; Title III, addressing discrimination in public facilities; Title IV,
addressing desegregation of public education; Title V, concerning the Commission on Civil
Rights; Title VI, addressing discrimination in federally assisted programs; Title VII, address-
ing discrimination in employment; Title VIII concerning fair housing; and Tide X, establish-
ing community relations services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
Major amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 occurred in 1972, with enactment of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and again in 1991, with enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
m See infra Part III.B.1. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "[t] he assumption is that a certain individual possesses characteristics by virtue
2000] 439
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ployment discrimination cases, federal courts have adopted a spe-
cial inference of discrimination against blacks.255 Collectively, these
laws evidence clear policy against discrimination against blacks, not
whites.
1. Historical Application of Civil Rights Laws
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Civil Rights Act")
as a means of addressing various types of societal inequities.256 Spe-
cifically, for example, Congress sought to remedy racial discrimina-
tion, almost exclusively against blacks, in voting rights, housing,
and employment.2 57 To achieve these goals, Congress enacted fa-
cially neutral laws outlawing certain statutorily defined acts of dis-
crimination. For example, with respect to employment discrimi-
nation, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 59 Title
VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire...
discharge . . . [or] otherwise discriminate" against an individual
"because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. "2e° On its face, Title VII prohibits discrimination against
blacks as well as whites.261
of being a member of a certain racial group" but that "[ti his assumption. ... does not with-
stand scrutiny"), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
See infra Part III.B.2.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
See, e.g., id.; Voting Rights Act of 1965, id. § 1973 (1994) (creating voting rights for
minorities and preventing gerrymandering); Title VIII, id. §§ 3601-3619 (remedying racial
discrimination in housing); 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1999) (providing interpretive guidelines dis-
cussing remedial measures to be taken in accordance with Title VII to rectify racial discrimi-
nation in workplace).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6.
See id. § 2000e et seq.
In pertinent part, section 703 (a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin....
Id. §2000e-2(a) (1).
" Indeed, this is the way Congress intended it to be. As the legislative history of Title
VII indicates, "[the law is intended to] cover white men and white women and all Ameri-
cans," 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler), and create an "obligation not
to discriminate against whites." Id. at 7218 (memorandum of Sen. Clark); see also id. at 7213
(memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case); id. at 8912 (statement of Sen. Williams).
440
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 440 1999-2000
2000] The Power of the Treasury
Although Title VII may be facially neutral, Congress principally
intended the statute to remedy discrimination against blacks.262
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress was "en-
deavor[ing] to protect the Negro's right to first-class citizenship" by
fashioning a means to eliminate discrimination in important as-
pects of citizenship such as "voting, education, equal protection of
the laws, and free access to places of public accommodation."263
However, Congress recognized that substantive equality required
an end to discrimination in employment, because economic well-
being is a predicate to exercising formal rights and liberties. '
Thus, prohibiting discrimination in employment was necessary. It
is significant that the legislative history of Title VII specifically ref-
erences society's "failure to extend job opportunities to the Ne-
gro. 265 Clearly, Congress's motivation, at least in part, for enacting
Title VII was specifically to reduce employment discrimination
against blacks.2
2 See Cunningham, supra note 86, at 446; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) ("In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and again in Albe-
marle, the Court noted that a primary objective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal
employment opportunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male
employees over other employees.") (citations omitted).
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.CAN. 2391, 2513.
The House Report for Title VII provides:
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach.
The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment
is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a shal-
low victory where one's pockets are empty. The principle of equal treatment un-
der the law can have little meaning if in practice its benefits are denied the citi-
zen.
Id.
Id. at 2515.
This is not to suggest that the mostly white Congress in 1964 did not have a self-
interest in eliminating discrimination against blacks in employment. Indeed, the legislative
history notes that Congress anticipated that "national prosperity would be increased through
the proper training of Negroes for more skilled employment together with the removal of
barriers for obtaining such employment." See id.; see also S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.CA.N. 2355, 2363. The Senate Report states:
Events of recent weeks have again underlined how deeply our Negro citizens re-
sent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and ac-
commodations which are otherwise open to the general public. That is a daily in-
sult which has no place in a country proud of its heritage - the heritage of the
melting pot, of equal rights, of one nation and one people. No one has been
barred on account of his race from fighting or dying for America - there are no
"white" or "colored" signs on the foxholes or graveyards of battle. Surely, in 1963,
100 years after emancipation, it should not be necessary for any American citizen
to demonstrate in the streets for the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a
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The Treasury should carefully scrutinize this historical back-
ground of the Civil Rights Act in exercising its public policy power.
Given that discrimination against blacks formed the basis for these
laws, the Treasury should have a heightened level of awareness re-
garding discrimination against blacks. This is not to suggest that
the Treasury should not be concerned with tax-exempt charities
that discriminate against whites. To the contrary, the history of the
Civil Rights Act reflects a clear attempt to remedy all types of racial
discrimination. 67 Nevertheless, the Treasury should be especially
concerned about discrimination against blacks because of the con-
tinuing need to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination.
Moreover, the Treasury should attempt, to the extent of its ability
and authority, to reconcile the societal goals of racial justice for
blacks (as achieved through affirmative action and similar efforts)
with the consequential effects on whites. In the final analysis, it
may turn out that a tax-exempt entity that implements a quasi-
affirmative action plan or policy may be justified if the motivation- 268
for the preference for blacks is appropriate.
2. Current Application of Civil Rights Laws
Consistent with Congress's goal to end discrimination against
blacks in enacting the Civil Rights Acts, courts interpreting Title
VII have likewise focused on remedying discrimination against
blacks. Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized
lunch counter in the very department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a
motion picture house, on the same terms as any other customer.
Id,
'7 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
Notably, private employers have greater freedom to engage in more aggressive volun-
tary affirmative action programs aimed at attracting race and gender minorities than Title
VII requires, or that a court can impose. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (approving private employer's voluntary race-based affirmative
action for women); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979)
(approving a private employer's voluntary race-based affirmative action for blacks). This is
significant because most tax-exempt charities are private, nongovernmental actors. Thus,
when properly struictured, a private employer's voluntary affirmative action plan will not be
invalidated under Title VII so long as the plan is consistent with Congress's goal of eliminat-
ing discrimination against traditional minorities. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 204 ("'It
would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been excluded from the Ameri-
can dream for so long' constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.'")
(quoting statement of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964)).
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that the protection afforded under Title VII is available to all indi-
viduals, 69 the Court has made it easier for minorities to prove dis-
criminatory intent - a crucial element in a disparate treatment
action.7 °
The Supreme Court has outlined a three-stage process for de-
termining whether a Title VII claimant has suffered unlawful dis-
crimination.2 7 ' First, the Title VII claimant must establish a prima,," " . . . . 272
facie case for discrimination. To make out a prima facie case, the
Title VII claimant must present direct evidence of discrimination
by the defendant or prove the existence of discrimination through
circumstantial evidence. 73 If this burden is met, the Title VII de-
fendant must then establish a nondiscriminatory reason for the
274employment decision. Lastly, the burden shifts back to the Title
VII plaintiff to prove the defendant's alleged reason is pretextual . 5
In cases that lack direct evidence of discrimination, the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,276 established a four-
prong test for establishing a prima facie case of employment dis-
crimination:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.2 "
Thus, under this test, the fact finder may infer discrimination even
in the absence of direct proof of discriminatory intent.
See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976) ("Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of 'any individual' because of 'such
individual's race.' Its terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any par-
ticular race.").
'7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994); see also Cunningham, supra note 86, at 449
(noting that unlawful discrimination is defined by statute).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
'a See id. at 802.
'" See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
V4 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
See id. at 804.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
'7 Id. at 802.
2000] 443
HeinOnline  -- 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 443 1999-2000
444 University of California, Davis [Vol. 33:389
The inference created under the Supreme Court's four-prong
test for establishing a prima facie case in Title VII disparate treat-
ment cases clearly provides some advantage to blacks (as members
of a racial minority) that does not generally exist for whites in such
cases.2 78 This is not to say that whites cannot succeed as individual
claimants in Title VII employment discrimination cases. 9 Indeed,
they can and have succeeded in such cases. 20 The point is that the
historical development of Title VII, coupled with the history of ra-
cial discrimination in this country, indicates that discrimination
against blacks, specifically, is clearly against public policy. 28' While
an employer's dismissal of a black person with no justification
might result in a successful discrimination claim, dismissal of a•282
white person with no justification is less likely to be successful..
' See Cunningham, supra note 86, at 452 ("In essence, the McDonnell Douglas test states
that when a qualified, presumptively disadvantaged person has been the object of an adverse
employment decision regarding an available position, the individual has established a pre-
sumption of discrimination.").
' See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against whites).
See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 126 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding
that white faculty member of university prevailed on merits in Tide VII race discrimination
claim against university whose faculty was predominantly black).
"9 See Harding v. Gray, 9F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Hardingcourt stated:
Thus, in an ordinary discrimination case, in which the plaintiff is a member of a
minority group, an "inference of discrimination" arises when the employer simply
passes over the plaintiff for a promotion to a position for which he is qualified.
No such inference arises when, as in this case, the plaintiff is a white man. Invidi-
ous racial discrimination against whites is relatively uncommon in our society, and so there
is nothing inherently suspicious in an employer's decision to promote a qualified minority
applicant instead of a qualfied white applicant. Thus, in order to establish a prima fa-
cie case under Title VII, this Court requires a white plaintiff to show additional
"background circumstances [that] support the suspicion that the defendant is that
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." This requirement is
not designed to disadvantage the white plaintiff, who is entitled to the same Title
VII protection as a minority plaintiff. Instead, the background circumstances re-
quirement merely substitutes for the minority plaintiffs burden to show that he is
a member of a racial minority; both are criteria for determining when the em-
ployer's conduct raises an "inference of discrimination."
Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"9 This result is due in part to the fact that a white person may not be able to establish
the existence of other appropriate circumstances that create a presumption of discrimina-
tion, whereas a black person must merely assert racial status as supporting the Title VII
claim. See Cunningham, supra note 86, at 453. Professor Cunningham provides:
Thus while Title VII protections are available to both disadvantaged and non-
disadvantaged plaintiffs, the historical facts of discrimination mean that a pre-
sumption of discrimination coincides with certain identities and not others. The
first prong of the disparate treatment prima facie test establishes a presumption of
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If the Treasury were simply to follow parallel approaches to
claims of discrimination by charities against blacks and against
whites, it would be ignoring this particular aspect of our nation's
public policy with respect to race. In exercising its public policy
power, the Treasury should take into account how discrimination
laws are administered in nontax contexts. Indeed, the premise
upon which the public policy power is based is that the federal
government should not grant tax exemption to organizations
whose business practices contravene fundamental societal stan-
dards.283 As previously indicated in Part III.A., there is no clearly
established public policy against appropriate affirmative action
efforts. Thus, while discrimination based on race may be contrary
to public policy in the abstract, the Treasury should not treat dis-
crimination against blacks and alleged discrimination against
whites in the same way, 284 but should focus its public policy efforts
on organizations that discriminate against blacks.
CONCLUSION
In this era of affirmative action retrenchment, many efforts at
achieving racial justice are hampered by a variety of legal chal-
lenges to affirmative action. Although many of the civil rights vic-
tories of the 60s; 70s, and even early 80s were premised on the no-
tion that racial discrimination is unacceptable in modern society,
unlawful discrimination for those individuals who possess identities likely to sub-
ject them to prohibited forms of discrimination or who belong to historically dis-
advantaged groups. This presumption of disadvantage does not exist for individu-
als who are protected by the statute but do not possess identities tending to foster
prohibited forms of discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
See generally BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1987) (involving Title
VII claim of sex discrimination by man against his employer). The Johnson Court held:
This case . . . fits readily within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or
sex has been taken into account in an employer's employment decision, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its deci-
sion. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such
a plan is articulated as the basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is
invalid. As a practical matter, of course, an employer will generally seek to avoid a
charge of pretext by presenting evidence in support of its plan.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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these victories will be short-lived if claims of wrongful discrimina-
tion against whites continue to impede racial remediation efforts.
Although the Court's enlistment of the Treasury Department in
the civil rights struggle in 1983 was attractive, contemporary occur-
rences reveal that this was inappropriate.
This Article proposes the elimination of the Treasury Depart-
ment's public policy power to deny charitable status to organiza-
tions that discriminate. The legal basis upon which that power is
premised - that Congress authorized the Treasury to determine
and enforce notions of public policy as law - is poorly supported.
Congress has passed no law that affirmatively states that the Treas-
ury shall, pursuant to its own determinations of "established public
policy," grant or deny tax-exempt charitable status to organizations
that discriminate based on race. Additionally, Congress has not
ratified, expressly or implicitly, the Court's interpretation that the
public policy power emanates from the Treasury's obligation to
interpret the term "charitable" in section 501 (c) (3) of the Code.
Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that, barring
a contrary statement by Congress, an executive agency's statutory
authority is not plenary in nature. Rather, such agency's authority
is generally limited to those matters relating to the agency's area of
expertise as expressed in, or authorized by, statute.
Accordingly, Congress should act to ensure that charities cannot
discriminate in violation of established policies on race. One pos-
sibility is for Congress to enact a law that either (1) expressly pro-
vides that charities must comply with "established public policy" or
(2) outlaws subordinating racial discrimination by all tax-exempt
charities. Another possibility is for Congress to authorize a sepa-
rate agency, other than the Treasury, to review and rule upon
complaints of discrimination by tax-exempt charities. Indeed,
other federal agencies are better equipped than the Treasury at
handling racial discrimination issues. Title VI and other provisions
of the Civil Rights Act may provide a mechanism for accomplishing
this objective. 2 5 The current bar to utilization of Tide VI may be
Tire VI of the Civil Rights Act provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
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the lack of "federal financial assistance," which is a requirement for
Title VI applicability. 28 6 Additional research may reveal that this
apparent bar is illusory.
This Article's alternative suggestion is that the Court, or the
Treasury of its own accord, restricts the Treasury's use of its public
policy power to instances of discrimination against blacks. The
Court should not permit the Treasury to use the public policy
power to revoke or deny tax-exempt charitable status to charities
that engage in appropriate affirmative action, even when the result
of the affirmative action is that a black person is preferred over a
white person. Affirmative action is not necessarily contrary to any
"established" public policy on race. In constitutional law, for ex-
ample, although there is no compelling government interest that
would justify discrimination against blacks, the Court has held that
affirmative action may be constitutional if resulting from an ap-
propriate plan. Further, while civil rights laws protect both blacks
and whites from racial discrimination, our nation's civil rights legal
history and the current civil rights framework indicate that dis-
crimination against blacks is more likely to run afoul of civil rights
restrictions than racial preferences for blacks that disadvantage
whites. The Treasury should not, therefore, use its public policy
power to revoke the tax-exempt status of organizations that partici-
pate in appropriate affirmative action plans.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
2N For purposes of Title VI, federal financial assistance is "assistance to any program or
activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty."
Id. § 2000(d) (1).
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